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PROTECTION FOR MOBILIZING IMPROVEMENTS




Prior to 1985, the United States and the Soviet Union lagged other
industrialized nations in legal protection for workers.' Both the United
* J.D. candidate 1994, Washington College of Law, The American University.
This Comment is dedicated to Carla D. Barboza, a samurai.
1. See Donald H. J. Hermann & Yvonne S. Sor, Property Rights in One's Job:
The Case for Limiting Employment-at-Will, 24 ARIZ. L. REV. 763, 804-12 (1982)
(comparing United States dismissal law with that of several industrialized European
countries for purposes of suggesting improvements to the substantive and procedural
aspects of United States law). Laws in Germany. France, and the United Kingdom
prohibited managers from firing workers merely for objecting to manager decisions.
See id. at 808-10 (stating that German, French, and English managers could not fire
workers without good cause). Examples of good cause for termination included: theft,
insubordination, absenteeism, fraud, stealing business secrets, or fighting in the
workplace. Id In contrast, United States law would not intervene when the manager
fired the worker for objecting to the manager's decisions. See id. at 765-70 (noting
that American managers could fire workers without giving a reason).
The former Soviet Union, similarly, before 1985 did not protect workers who
contested against managers regarding improvements to the workplace. See ABEL
AGANBEGYAN, INSIDE PERESTROIKA: THE FUrURE oF mE SovIET ECONOmY, 107-0
(Helen Szamuely trans., 1989) (stating that the Soviet Union rarely applied legal
methods for protecting the rights of citizens). The inferiority of Soviet production re-
sulted partly from the lack of opportunities and incentives for Soviet workers to make
improvements in production processes. Id. at 61. Aganbegyan described Soviet assess-
ments of possible workplace reforms that might raise the quality and efficiency of
Soviet production. Id. at 41-58. Making Soviet production competitive in world mar-
kets required making workers responsible for workplace decisions. Id. at 68-69. Get-
ting workers to take responsibility for the workplace, in turn, required legal
protections for workers. See id. at 107-08 (stating that law and the economy are in-
terdependent, and that restructuring the legal system was necessary to realize improve-
ments in the economy).
For this Comment, "worker" is defined as an employee whose work is directed
by a "manager." Theoretically, the manager has authority from the "owner" by way
of the chain of command to hire and fire the workers who are within the manager's
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States and the Soviet Union pursued policies aimed at compelling work-
er obedience to the commands of managers.2 But in 1985, Mikhail
Gorbachev, then General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union, introduced perestroika3 to "restructure" management practices to
improve production quality and efficiency.' By establishing new worker
span of control. "Ownership," however, cannot justify the manager's arbitrary right to
fire workers in modem settings. See Peter Linzer, The Decline of Assent: At-Will
Employment as a Case Study of the Breakdown of Private Law Theory, 20 GA. L.
REV. 323, 397 (1986) (rejecting the United States notion that the manager's right to
fire employees without a valid reason derived logically from the owner's property
right to control the workplace). The shareholders are the legal owners of the modem
corporation, but they generally exercise negligible control over the managers who
make the decisions to hire and fire. Id. Even managers are workers whom superior
managers can fire without a valid reason. See ROBERT E. LACEY, FORD: THE MEN
AND THE MACHINE 639, 657 (Ballantine paperback, ed. 1987) (describing how Henry
Ford II, the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Ford Motor Company, fired
Lee Iacocca, then President of Ford). Iacocca was fired despite achieving record prof-
its for the firm. Id.
Employees who attempt to improve the workplace generally lack protection. See
Kern v. DePaul Mental Health Servs. Inc., 544 N.Y.S.2d 252, 252-53 (App. Div.
1989) (refusing a cause of action where a worker was fired for disclosing a statutory
violation presenting a danger to an individual), appeal denied, 549 N.E.2d 151 (N.Y.
1989). The court held that if the worker acted to protect merely the rights of an
individual and did not remove a threat to the "public at large" as required by the
whistleblower statute, the court could not offer protection against the manager who
fires the worker for doing a commendable deed. Id.
2. See PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR
AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 199 (1990) (noting that the traditional United States
workplace required the worker to do exactly what the manager commanded); Tatyana
Tchetvemina, Labour Incentives in Alternative Forms of Production, in IN SEARCH OF
FLEXIBILITY: THE NEW SOVIET LABOUR MARKET 203, 205 (Guy Standing ed., 1991)
[hereinafter IN SEARCH OF FLExiBILrrY] (stating that Soviet production depended upon
workers following orders thoughtlessly).
3. See MIKHAIL GORBACHEV, PERESTROIKA: NEW THINKING FOR OUR COUNTRY
AND THE WORLD xi (Perennial Library 1988) (1987) (defining perestroika as "restruc-
turing").
4. See Report by Gorbachev, Summary of World Broadcasts, Apr. 25, 1985, at
I, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BBCSWB File (transcribing Gorbachev's speech.
which announced the main points of the perestroika program for restructuring the
Soviet economy). According to Gorbachev, Soviet managers interfered with local ini-
tiative. Id. at 7. Low quality and high cost of Soviet production compelled a restruc-
turing, a perestroika. GOI.BACHEV, supra note 3, at 5-7. Decreasing government regu-
lation and increasing the independence of local enterprises would also serve to re-
structure Soviet production. Report by Gorbachev, supra, at 7. Under the restructuring,
workers earned incentives by making improvements in the workplace. Id. at 6-7. As a
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rights and duties, such as giving workers the right to elect managers,
perestroika legislation gave workers oversight of management decisions?
The United States, by contrast, generally continues to allow managers
to fire6 or punish7 workers who object to management decisions.8 Tra-
part of the economic revisions, political reformers aimed at increasing democratic par-
ticipation in the country's governance to make the restructuring permanent and self-
sustaining. GORBACHEV, supra note 3, at 43, 49. One month after becoming General
Secretary, Gorbachev took considerable personal risk in announcing the perestroika
program. BORIs YELTSIN, AGAINST THE GRAIN 139 (Michael Glenny trans. 1990).
Gorbachev could have successfully postponed political and economic crisis for his
lifetime. I. But instead, he chose to lead the nation on a campaign to resolve the
economic issues before they grew to catastrophic proportions. Id. at 139-41. Had he
postponed serious problem-solving, the problems would get worse and would cause an
eventual economic collapse. See id. at 141 (stating that postponing the problem-solv-
ing would result in national suicide, but probably after Gorbachev's time).
5. See The Law of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Cooperatives in
the U.S.S.R., 22 Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, June 1. 1988, Item 355.
translated in 28 I.L.M. 719, 732 (1989) [hereinafter Soviet Law on Cooperatives]
(granting to members of a cooperative the right to employment in the cooperative, the
right to participate in management, and the right to elect and be elected as directors
and officers of the cooperative).
6. See Former Loan Officer Takes Suit Over Firing to State Supreme Court.
UPI, May 8, 1989,-available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (describing loan offi-
cer Dynan's claim that he was fired for refusing to approve a bad investment-loan);
Dynan v. Rocky Mountain Fed. Say. and Loan, 792 P.2d 631, 640 (VWyo. 1990)
(denying a cause of action even if the worker could show that the firing was punish-
ment for objecting when management insisted on making a bad loan). The Wyoming
Supreme Court stated that the health of the savings and loan industry did not depend
on employees correcting management because the loan policies of savings and loan
associations were regulated and enforced by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. Id.
The Federal Home Loan Bank Board finally did intervene after Rocky Mountain
Federal closed because of excessive bad loans. Rick Stouffer, Equimark Deal Meshes
Pair of WY Institutions, Prrr. Bus. TImES & J., Dec. 26, 1988, at A19, available in
LEXS, Nexis Library, PBT File. Over $70 million of Rocky Mountain bad loans be-
came liabilities for the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation. Id.
7. See Samuel C. Florman, Beyond Whistleblowing; Organizational Changes Can
Eliminate the Need for Corporate Martyrdom, TECH. REV., July 1989, at 20 (relating
engineer Boisjoly's heroic, but unsuccessful, effort to stop the Space Shuttle
Challenger's flight by repeatedly warning Thiokol's management about the inadequa-
cies in the shuttle's joints). William J. Broad, The Shuttle Explodes: 6 in Crew and
High-School Teacher Are Killed 74 Seconds After Liftoff, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1986.
at Al (relating the story of Challenger's fateful launch and subsequent explosion);
William D. Marbach et al., What Happened?, NEwsw,, Feb. 17, 1986, at 32 (de-
scribing the formation of a presidential commission to investigate the cause of the
Challenger explosion); Maura Dolan and William C. Rempel, Took Hard Look at
NASA Management; Shuttle Panel Evolved into Bold Investigators, L.A. TIMEs, June
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ditional legal arguments propose that the manager must have the right to
compel worker obedience.' Unfortunately, this may limit incentives for
workers to develop their skills fully, and may accelerate the current
decline of United States competitiveness." Restoring United States com-
9, 1986, at Al (stating that Allan McDonald and Roger Boisjoly had objected to
management's decision to launch because they predicted the cold weather might cause
a seal containing the rocket's fire to fail during the launch). Thiokol management
reassigned Boisjoly and McDonald, presumably as punishment for identifying the
technical and administrative problems that jeopardized shuttle launches. Id. Throughout
the development of the space shuttle, management ignored and downplayed valid
objections raised by engineers regarding the O-ring seal that failed and started the
Challenger explosion. Tom Bancroft, Two Minutes, FIN. WORLD, June 27, 1989, at 28.
Thiokol management forbade engineers to talk with NASA officials about problems,
withheld hazard reports from NASA, and suppressed safety information. Id. Some
workers, however, frustrated by management's concealment of serious safety problems,
informed the FBI. Id.; see also Space Shuttle Accident and the Rogers Commission
Report: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Science, Technology, and Space of the
Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 86
(1986) [hereinafter Space Shuttle Accident Hearings] (statement of Sen. Hollings)
(concluding that the engineers were right and management was wrong concerning the
vulnerability of the O-ring seals to the bitter cold). The engineers had no procedure
for influencing managers, and no process for objecting to faulty manager decisions.
See id. at 72-74 (statement of Hon. William P. Rogers, Chairman, Presidential Com-
mission on the Space Shuttle "Challenger" Accident) (concluding that a flawed'deci-
sion process, as well as a flawed O-ring design, caused the shuttle accident).
8. See Jay E. Grenig, The Dismissal of Employees in the United States, 130
INr'L LAB. REV. 569, 569 (1991) (stating that the United States is the last major
industrialized country that generally permits managers to fire workers for no reason).
State and federal statutes have protected some workers in specific situations by requir-
ing that the manager have a "just" or "good" cause for the firing. Id. Collective
bargaining agreements may provide protection against arbitrary firing, arbitrary reas-
signment, and other mistreatment. WEILER, supra note 2, at 7. Only about fifteen
percent of United States workers, however, are covered under collective bargaining
agreements. Id. at 10.
9. See Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L.
REV. 947, 951 (1984) (postulating that labor market efficiency generally requires the
legal presumption that managers can compel obedience with the threat of firing); Mar-
tin Marietta Corp. v. Lorenz, 823 P.2d 100, 109 (Colo. 1992) (asserting that the
manager had a right to fire for refusing to obey a command unless such command
involved an illegal act, or one against public policy). Hence, in a controversy between
a manager and worker over the business interests of the firm, efficiency requires that
the worker have no protection against retaliatory firing. See id. at 110 (establishing
that protection accrued only when the worker had a reasonable belief that the
manager's command was illegal, for example, in violating the worker's duty as a citi-
zen or infringing his employment rights).
10. See John Hoerr, What Should Unions Do?, HARV. Bus. REV., May-June
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petitiveness may require protecting the worker's investment in a job by
guaranteeing certain returns based on results." This Comment argues
that international market competition will force the United States, just as
it did the Soviet Union, to grant workers more legal protections."
Part I of this Comment reviews the lack of legal protection under the
"employment-at-will" doctrine for American workers who attempt to
correct unlawful, unsafe, or uneconomical decisions of managers. 3 Part
I reveals how, under the policy of perestroika, Russian law imitates
many features of successful Japanese and European workplaces.
Perestroika encourages workers to take responsibility for circumstances
in the workplace.' In particular, Russian law offers property rights to
the workplace as an assurance that successful results in the marketplace
will effect a return for worker-initiated improvements. 5
Part Ill argues that employment-at-will in the United States, like com-
mand-management in the former Soviet Union, allows employers to
compel worker obedience and to suppress worker objections, complaints,
1991, at 30, 42 (stating that although success in international competition requires
skilled workers, both workers and managers lack proper incentives to develop the
worker skills that will make the national economy competitive).
11. See Doron P. Levin, Detroit Slow to Learn From Japan, N.Y. TMIES, May 5,
1992, at D-8 (describing how Ford Motor Company, under competitive pressure from
Japanese automobile manufacturers, consciously and successfully adopted the Japanese
car makers' participatory management techniques). General Motors, in attempting to
recover market share lost to the Japanese, also considered copying Japanese manage-
ment methods, but faced problems relinquishing its normal autocratic management
style. L After failing to duplicate Japanese quality and price with intensive robotic
assemblies, General Motors finally applied Japanese management methods at the Sat-
urn Plant in Spring Hill, Tennessee. Id. General Motors granted workers annual in-
come, incentive pay, and a strong contractual commitment to lifetime employment.
Unions Can Play Important Role in Restructuring U.S. Business, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA), Jan. 16, 1992, at A19. Managers and workers shared responsibilities for deci-
sion-making in a structural manner. l Making workers responsible for improving
quality and efficiency has greatly improved competitiveness. Levin, supra, at D8.
12. See infra part IV (arguing that employment-at-will is a judicial intervention
that hinders the recovery of American competitiveness in international markets).
13. See infra notes 20-87 and accompanying text (describing the lack of legal
protection for American workers attempting to improve the quality and efficiency of
their workplaces).
14. See Report by Gorbachev, supra note 8, at 7 (calling for
everyone to work conscientiously and unreservedly to improve efficiency and produc-
tion).
15. See infra notes 88-168 and accompanying text (describing perestroika reforms
aimed at making the Russian workplace competitive in international markets).
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and suggestions. In both the United States and the former Soviet Union,
lawmakers assumed that production efficiency required that workers
obey managers. 6 Compelling worker obedience, however, stifles the
worker resourcefulness that is necessary to duplicate the quality and effi-
ciency offered by foreign competitors. 7
Part IV explores recent corporate attempts in the United States to
duplicate the management procedures which have propelled foreign com-
petitors into dominant market positions. Evidently, workers will not
exercise an adequate level of resourcefulness unless the law or compa-
nies themselves protect that exercise. 8 As a result, the preservation of
jobs in the international context will require protections for the worker
against management retaliation.
Part V recommends a common law and statutory basis for protecting
workers who mobilize improvements in the workplace. Courts and legis-
latures in the United States should recognize and protect the worker's
property interest in workplace-specific skills and resourcefulness. 9
I. EXISTING PROTECTIONS FOR WORKERS AGAINST
MANAGER RETALIATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
International standards for human rights propose that everyone has a
right to work under just conditions" that preserve fundamental free-
doms.2' To ensure that workers are not fired unless there is a valid
16. See infra notes 169-211 and accompanying text (discussing both the United
States and Russian approach to employer obedience in the workplace).
17. See infra notes 199-211 and accompanying text (arguing that the workplace
competitiveness of both the United States and the former Soviet Union are disadvan-
taged in international trade by a lack of protection for workers attempting to improve
their workplaces).
18. See infra notes 212-41 and accompanying text (arguing that workers generally
require legal protection from management retaliation or they will not participate in the
workplace at creative levels that will compete in international markets.).
19. See infra notes 242-67 and accompanying text (suggesting that American and
Russian workplaces will not be competitive on quality and efficiency in international
markets unless American and Russian courts protect workers who attempt to improve
their workplaces).
20. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(1II), Art. 23(1),
U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) (proclaiming a right to "just and favorable conditions of
work"). The United States voted for adopting this declaration, but the Soviet Union
abstained. BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW: SELECTED
DOCUMENTS 352 n.1 (1991).
21. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A.
[VOL. 9:1
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reason, ' this standard would mandate a pre-termination procedurep
and a process for appeal.- Under international standards, these proce-
dures apply regardless of the reason for termination.
The United States is the only major industrialized nation that contin-
ues to depart from the international standard that prohibits the termina-
tion of an employee absent a valid reason.' Nevertheless, federal and
Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16). Art. 6(2), U.N. Doe. A/6316 (1966) (pro-
claiming safeguards for political and economic rights in the workplace). While the So-
viet Union ratified this covenant, the United States has not. CARTER & TRIBLE,
supra note 20, at 376 n.1.
22. See Termination of Employment at the Initiative of the Employer, REC. PROC.
[International Labour Office], at 30/21, Art. 4 (1982) [hereinafter Termination] (pro-
posing that a worker may be fired only for a legitimate reason that relates to job
performance). This labor standard was developed by the International Labour Office
0LO), a United Nations subsidiary in Geneva that was formed for the purpose of
improving the conditions of workers internationally. Statements on U.S. Relations with
ILO [International Labour Officel Presented Before Senate Labor and Human Re-
sources Comm., Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 177, at E-15 to E-16 (Sept. 12, 1985)
[hereinafter Statements] (statement of Abraham Katz, President, U.S. Council for Inter-
national Business). Under ILO auspices, government, employer, and worker representa-
tives from the member nations examine democratically selected labor issues and devel-
op standards to address these issues. ld. at E-15. Subsequently, member nations have
an obligation to consider ratifying and implementing the resulting standards as domes-
tic law. See id at E-4 (statement of George P. Shultz, Secretary of State) (responding
to the frequent attacks that the United States creates a false impression internationally
because it applies international labor standards to other countries, but disregards the
standards domestically). Since joining the ILO in 1934, the United States has ratified
only seven of 160 ILO standards, and six of the standards that the United States
ratified apply only to maritime occupations. ld. at E-17 to E-18. The United States
Supreme Court, however, considered ILO standards as relevant in deciding that a
Maryland statute prohibiting sales on Sunday could have a secular purpose. McGowan
v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 450-51 (1961) (citing 1921 and 1956 International Labour
Office standards which established that major industrialized countries, though originally
declaring one day off each week for religious purposes, should continue to grant all
workers the same day off for secular reasons); see also Eagle-Picher Indus. v. Liberty
Mutual Ins. Co., 829 F.2d 227, 236 (Ist Cir. 1987) (accepting an International Labour
Office standard as reasonable for assessing the risks of lung-disease).
23. Termination, supra note 22, at 30/21, art. 7.
24. Termination, supra note 22, at 30/21. art. 8.
25. Grenig, supra note 8, at 569; see also Termination, supra note 22, at 3514
(statement of Mr. Weinberg, Employers' Adviser, United States) (opposing a require-
ment that managers give a "valid reason" for firing a worker because this standard
frustrates the United States doctrine of employment-at-will); id. at 35/4-5 (statement of
Mr. Peterson, Government Adviser, United States) (asserting the United States view
that reducing government intervention and encouraging the freedom of association,
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state legislation does protect workers when legislatures deem such pro-
tection necessary for political or moral reasons. 6 Unlike most industri-
alized countries,' however, the United States has no national policy to
protect the majority' of its workers in speech or action to do their jobs
better. 9 Moreover, when managers fire workers for protesting business
together with the implied right of workers to leave and managers to fire without a
government requirement of valid reason could help solve the world economic prob-
lems). Montana, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands have adopted statutes limiting the
manager's right to fire. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-901 (1992); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit.
29, § 185 (1992); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 76 (1992). A Uniform Employment
Termination Act based on the Montana statute has been drafted for adoption by
states. Model Uniform Employment Termination Act Adopted Aug. 8. 1991, by Nation-
al Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Subject to Finalization by
Commission Fall 1991, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 156, at D-1 (Aug. 13, 1991)
[hereinafter Model Uniform Employment Termination Act] (reprinting the text of the
proposed model state statute); see also Model Termination Act Would Improve Reme-
dies Available to Fired Employees, St. Antoine Says, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 94,
at A-2 (May 14, 1992) [hereinafter Act Would Improve] (stating that the arbitration
provisions of the model state legislation would be more comprehensive and depend-
able than the current tort and contract remedies available through litigation). The
provisions of the model statute, as well as the Montana, Puerto Rico, and Virgin
Islands provisions, however, are inadequate to protect workers attempting to improve
the workplace because there is insufficient guarantee of worker participation in deci-
sion making. See Statements Adopted by AFL-CIO Executive Council, Bal Harbour,
Fla., Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 34, E-1 (Feb. 23, 1987) [hereinafter Statements
Adopted] (noting that reinstatements of workers found to be wrongfully discharged are
significantly more successful if the reinstated worker has influence over manager deci-
sions through political support from a team of fellow workers).
26. See infra note 33 (summarizing selected federal and state statutes responding
to voter demands for legislative action to protect workers); 79 Cong. Rec. 7565
(1935), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS Acr, 1935, at 2341 (1985) (statement of Sen. Wagner) (noting the high
cost to the American economy for permitting the long and violent conflict between
employers and workers over the validity of labor unions, and justifying a legal recog-
nition of the right to union organizing as a means of restoring peace in American
industry).
27. See Clyde W. Summers, Individual Rights in the Workplace: The Employ-
ment-at-Will Issue: Introduction, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 201, 203-04 (1983) (observing
that in comparison to other industrialized countries, the United States stands alone in
failing to protect workers against invalid terminations); 138 CONG. REC. S7951-52
(daily ed. Mar. 26, 1992) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (charging that business in the
United States, unlike business in most other industrialized democracies, has refused to
grant democratic rights in the workplace).
28. See WEILER, supra note 2, at 10 (noting that over 80% of workers in the
United States have no union protection); Act Would Improve, supra note 25, at A-2
(estimating that 150,000 workers are fired each year without a valid business reason).
29. See Vella v. United Cerebral Palsy, 535 N.Y.S.2d 292, 294 (Sup. Ct. 1988)
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decisions, courts and legislatures in the United States are reluctant to
intervene, even when management's conduct is unethical' or unsafe to
the general public.3
This reluctance to protect workplace rights is consistent with a general
United States aversion to involve government in maintaining the rights
of one citizen against another,' unless there is public outrage.' Rights
and freedoms in the United States generally are protections against gov-
ernment intrusions, not protections against injuries caused by private
parties.'
(refusing a cause of action where a worker was fired for revealing overpayment and
wrongful payment of public funds because these allegations did not constitute a spe-
cific threat to the "public health or safety" as required for protection under the state
whistleblower statute). A deficiency in legal protection for workers in objecting to
wasteful or dangerous management decisions chills improvements in quality and price.
137 CONG. REC. E1366 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1991) (statement of Rep. Clay) (arguing
that workers are more productive and work harder when they maintain the right to
express opinions about their work). Representative Clay proposed that the United
States provide federal protection of expression in the workplace similar to the
protections provided by major competitor nations. Id.
30. See Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 417 A.2d 505 (NJ. 1980) (denying
a cause of action to a worker who alleged that the manager's research was unethical
and finding that the research, even if unethical, did not violate a "clear mandate of
public policy").
31. See Rachford v. Evergreen Int'l Airlines, 596 F. Supp. 384 (N.D. Il1. 1984)
(finding that a worker had failed to state a claim where the manager fired the worker
for complaining about unsafe conditions violative of federal standards). There was no
law which prohibited firing a worker for complaining about the manager's violations
of federal standards. l
32. See Louis Henkin, Constitutionalism and Human Rights, in
CONsTrruTIoNALisM AND RIGHTS: THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNrrIED STATES CONSTITU-
TION ABROAD 383, 389-91 (Louis Henkin and Albert J. Rosenthal eds., 1990) (ex-
plaining that the United States Constitution protects citizens against individual action,
as opposed to state action, only when the right not to be held in slavery is threat-
ened).
33. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 141 (prohibiting firing or punishment for union activi-
ty); 29 U.S.C. § 621 (forbidding adverse action based on age); 29 U.S.C. § 701
(outlawing disciplinary action for worker injuries); 29 U.S.C. § 2001 (prohibiting
firing or punishment for refusing specified lie detector tests); 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a)
(outlawing disciplinary action for disabilities); 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (prohibiting firing
or punishment based on race, color, national origin, religion, or sex); N.Y. LAB. LAW
§ 740 (McKinney 1988) (prohibiting disciplinary action for revealing situations threat-
ening to the "public at large").
34. Epstein, supra note 9, at 953-54. Epstein argues that the Constitution guards
individual freedoms against invasion by the government only. Id. Furthermore, the
Constitution protects the freedom of contract against government invasion, as it does
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Unlike other industrialized nations, the United States continues to
resist international efforts to obligate governments to protect human
rights.35 Similarly, the United States also rejects a government role in
ensuring that managers have a valid business reason for firing a work-
er. 6 Under a theory that freedoms limit the right of government to in-
terfere in private enterprise, courts and legislatures in the United States
continue to justify ignoring worker rights issues in an idealized effort to
protect the freedoms of both the manager and the worker.3"
The common law doctrine of "employment-at-will"38 reflects this
concept of "freedom" as a limit on government interference.39 The
freedom of speech. Id. Thus, society tolerates the invasion of individual interests by
other individuals through an employment contract because it expects individuals to
defend themselves against such invasions. Id. By similar reasoning, the Supreme Court
has asserted that a child has no right to protection from his violent father because the
Constitution does not provide protection against the actions of individuals, only against
the actions of the government. DeShaney v. Winnebago Dep't of Social Serv., 489
U.S. 189, 195 (1989).
35. See 135 CoNG. Rac. E1616 (daily ed. May 10, 1989) (statement of Rep.
Fascell) (asserting that among major nations, only the United States has not ratified
the international human rights covenants); Henkin, supra note 32, at 390-91 (stating
that the United States rejects the notion that government is obligated to protect indi-
viduals from violations by other individuals).
36. See Termination, supra note 22, at 35/4-5 (statement of Mr. Petersen, Gov-
ernment Adviser, United States) (asserting that legal protections for workers endanger
liberty, hinder job creation, and increase unemployment).
37. Epstein, supra note 9, at 954-57. Epstein contends that if the state imposed a
standard requiring a valid reason for firing, workers would be injured as much as
employers. Id. To support this contention, Epstein states that, if such a measure
would benefit the worker, the worker would bargain for a contract with a limitation
on termination. Id. at 956-57.
38. Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549, 553 (1974) (Grimes, J. dis-
senting) (objecting to making an exception to the traditional employment-at-will rule
even if the worker had been fired for refusing the supervisor's sexual overtures). By
judicial presumption, an employment relationship of an indefinite term is "at-will." Id.
Either the manager or the worker can terminate the relationship at any time with no
liability. Id. No liability will ensue to either party whether the motive for termination
is "good cause, bad cause or no cause." Id. While no reason for termination must be
given, no reason given can create liability in either party. Id.
39. See Epstein, supra note 9, at 954 (stating that employment-at-will is a com-
mon expression of the freedom of contract and hence, no regulation of employment-
at-will can logically be justified in the name of individual freedom). Under employ-
ment-at-will, the courts and legislatures must presume that workers and managers
protect themselves from each other. Id. Courts and legislatures should not intervene to
substitute their judgment of fairness. Id.
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worker can quit and the manager can fire without giving notice or a
valid reason. Both quitting and firing are terminations of the at-will
relationship that involve no liability4 ' The courts justify the employ-
ment-at-will doctrine as a corollary of a policy favoring non-interference
with the freedom of either worker or manager to terminate their working
relationship."2 Courts may reject the employment-at-will doctrine, how-
ever, when there is evidence: 1) that a contract other than one at-will
was in force43 or 2) that the manager's motive in firing was unlaw-
ful."
A. CONTRACr-BASED LIMITATIONS ON THE RIGHT TO FIRE AT-WILL
Under contract law, employment-at-will operates as a rebuttable pre-
sumption.4' The worker can overcome the presumption by proving that
the contractual understanding was other than at-will." Explicit contracts
specifying the possible grounds for termination of the employment rela-
40. See Darlington v. General Elec., 504 A.2d 306, 316 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986)
(stating that, unless the employer promises to fire only for a valid business reason,
then the employer does not breach the employment contract when fring the worker
for following official company policy).
41. See Epstein, supra note 9, at 953-55 (implying that a limitation on the
manager's right to fire would require a corresponding limitation on the worker's right
to leave). But see Jack M. Beermann & Joseph W. Singer, Baseline Questions in
Legal Reasoning: The Example of Property in Jobs, 23 GA. L. REV. 911, 921-22,
922 n.28 (1989) (contending that employment-at-will cannot be justified by a require-
ment that a contract must be symmetrical, since contracts generally can be non-sym-
metrical).
42. See Murphy v. American Home Prods., 448 N.E.2d 86, 89 (N.Y. 1983)
(holding that if the court allows the manager to fire an accountant for reporting ille-
gal account transactions in violation of internal regulations, the court abstains from in-
terfering with the "unfettered right of termination lying at the core of an employment
at will").
43. See infra notes 47-58 and accompanying text (summarizing protections based
on explicit or construed contracts).
44. See infra notes 61-73 and accompanying text (summarizing protections based
on policy restrictions of the manager's motives for firing).
45. See Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880, 892 (Mich.
1980) (characterizing employment-at-will as a presumptive construction that can be
overcome by evidence of a company policy to terminate only for just cause): O'Neill
v. ARA Servs., Inc., 457 F. Supp. 182, 185 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (stating that, as a rule,
a contract of employment for an indefinite period of time is presumably terminable
at-will by either party, but that the at-will presumption may be overcome by showing
that the parties intended that contract to last for a reasonable time).
46. Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at 892.
1993] 319
320 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y [VOL. 9:1
tionship negate the employer's right to fire without just cause.47 In ad-
dition to written or oral contracts with specific workers or groups of
workers, courts may construe official personnel documents applied to
groups of workers as specifying grounds for termination. 8
In the absence of documents suggesting a contract, some courts have
recognized the worker's acts of detrimental reliance as evidence that the
business relationship was other than at-will.49 Moreover, some courts
have construed the existence of a contract requiring just cause for termi-
nation when the worker left a previous job,' moved,"' or gave up a
nearly vested pension. 2
47. See Drzewiecki v. H & R Block, Inc., 101 Cal. Rptr. 169 (Ct. App. 1972)
(holding that where a written contract for an indefinite period prohibited termination
except for improperly conducting business, the manager was liable unless the manager
showed that the worker handled business inappropriately); Ryan v. Upchurch, 474 F.
Supp. 211 (S.D. Ind. 1979) (holding that a manager was liable for firing a worker
without stating a valid reason if the worker was hired with an explicit promise,
though unwritten, that termination would be only for just cause).
48. See Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at 892 (holding that a company supervisory man-
ual declaring a policy to discharge for just cause would overcome the at-will pre-
sumption even though the fired worker did not learn of the just cause policy until
after his hiring). Documents which limit the manager's contractual right to fire in-
clude personnel policy manuals, employee handbooks, stock option agreements, and
collective bargaining agreements. See Carter v. Kaskaskia Community Action Agency,
322 N.E.2d 574, 576-78 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974) (holding that the grievance procedure
described in the personnel policy manual refuted an at-will contract, and that the
worker acquired a right to a grievance hearing before termination); Pine River State
Bank v. Mettille 333 N.W.2d 622, 624-31 (Minn. 1983) (holding that an employee
handbook defining a disciplinary procedure contractually obligated the manager to
follow the disciplinary procedure instead of firing at-will); Haney v. Laub, 312 A.2d
330 (Del. Super. Ct. 1973) (holding that a stock option agreement extinguished the
manager's right to fire at-will where the agreement specified validity until death or
dismissal for cause).
49. See O'Neill v. ARA Servs., Inc., 457 F. Supp. 182, 185-86 (E.D. Pa. 1978)
(holding that a manager's promise of a future promotion, together with a worker's
reliance in leaving his former employment, would show an employment contract that
the manager could not terminate at-will without incurring liability).
50. Id.
51. See McIntosh v. Murphy, 469 P.2d 177, 179-82 (Haw. 1970) (holding that
relocating the worker a great distance in reasonable reliance on the manager's offer of
a job indicated that a contract other than at-will existed and thus, the employer was
liable for breach).
52. See Rowe v. Noren Pattern & Foundry, 283 N.W.2d 713, 717 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1979) (holding that a worker's decision to give up a soon-to-vest pension at a
previous job because of a manager's job offer indicated a contract other than at-will
and that therefore, the manager must show just cause to avoid liability for breach).
1993] WORKPLACE PROTECTION 321
Some courts also hold that at-will employment contracts contain an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,n though this protection
may have limited scope.? Courts typically construe this covenant as
imposing on both the worker and the employer a duty not to take unfair
advantage of the other party even while pursuing self-interest." On that
basis, courts have held employers liable for damages when workers were
fired solely to avoid paying accrued commissions,; to discourage work-
ers from attempting to renegotiate salary," or to eliminate a temporary
worker where the manager led the worker to believe the hiring was
long-term 8
B. LIMITATIONS ON THE MOTIVES FOR WHICH MANAGERS CAN
FIRE AN AT-WILL WORKER
Theoretically, under an at-will employment contract, the manager can
fire for any reason or for no reason." Courts, however, have refused to
53. Merrill v. Crothall-American, Inc., 606 A.2d 96, 102 (Del. 1992). Under
common law, every contract contained an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. Il at 101-01. This implied covenant was extended even to employment con-
tracts construed as at-will in the absence of an express employment contract. Id.
54. See id. at 103 (stating that firing for no reason is not a violation of the im-
plied covenant of good faith and fair dealing).
55. Id. at 102.
56. Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977) (hold-
ing that, where a manager had an implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing in
a written contract specifying an at-will employment, the manager could not avoid
liability for commission on a major sale by exercising the option to terminate at-will).
Id.
57. See Sorenson v. Comm. Tek, Inc., 799 P.2d 70 (Idaho Ct. App. 1990)
(holding that the manager breached an implied covenant when he fired a worker as a
means of discouraging other workers from similarly negotiating for better contract
terms.)
58. See Merrill v. Crothall-American, Inc., 606 A.2d at 102 (acknowledging a
claim for breach of an implied covenant where the manager promised a worker a
steady job but continued interviewing for a permanent replacement employee).
59. See Dateline: New York, UPI, March 26. 1981, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Archives File (reporting pilot Pavolini's claim that he was fired because he
reported to the FAA that his charter airline employer was operating unsafe aircraft);
Pavolini v. Bard-Air Corp., 645 F.2d 144, 14748 (2d Cir. 1981) (commending the
pilot Pavolini for risking his job in the interest of public safety, but denying the pilot
federal court protection against retaliatory firing where the federal statute did not ex-
plicitly prohibit firing in retaliation); Pavolini v. Bard Air Corp., 451 N.Y.S.2d 288
(App. Div. 1982) (refusing to protect a worker from unwarranted termination in a
state claim unless that worker had a special employment contract, even when the
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condone certain reasons for firing.' Thus, in addition to enforcing ex-
press or implied employment contracts that require the manager to have
cause when terminating, most states grant protection against wrongful
discharge6 when the firing violates a clear public policy.62 Courts,
therefore, have held employers liable for damages if the worker was
fired for performing an important public duty or obligation,' exercising
a job-related legal right or privilege,' reporting violations of explicit
statutes to the proper authorities,65 or refusing to obey a command to
violate the law.'
Just as courts created the employment-at-will doctrine,67 courts creat-
ed the wrongful discharge exception to employment-at-will because they
disapproved of some motives for terminations.' Courts, however, are
worker could show that the termination was retaliation for reporting unsafe aircraft to
the proper federal authorities). In 1984, the New York legislature enacted a
"whistleblower protection statute" that provides limited protection when the worker can
show that the manager acted because the worker revealed a situation that threatened
the "public at large". N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740 (McKinney 1988).
60. See Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25, 28 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1959) (granting a cause of action if the worker was fired for refusing to com-
mit perjury).
61. See Martin Marietta Corp. v. Lorenz, 823 P.2d 100, 106 nn.3-4 (Colo. 1992)
(surveying, in a case of first impression, the states that adopted a cause of action for
wrongful discharge). Thirty-seven states had adopted wrongful discharge; nine had
declined; and three had not yet ruled on the issue. Id.
62. See id. 108-09 (granting a cause of action if a worker was fired for refusing
the manager's order to misrepresent testing deficiencies where the misrepresentation
would violate federal law).
63. See Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512, 516 (Or. 1975) (granting a cause of ac-
tion if the worker was fired for reporting availability for jury duty).
64. See Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425, 428 (Ind. 1973)
(granting a cause of action if the worker was fired for filing a workers compensation
claim as an exercise of a statutorily conferred right).
65. See Potter v. Village Bank of N.J., 543 A.2d 80, 87 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1988) (granting a cause of action to a bank president if the firing was for re-
porting illegal drug money laundering activities to the proper authorities).
66. See Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25, 28 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1959) (granting a cause of action to a worker if the firing was for refusing a
manager's command to commit perjury).
67. See Martin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 42 N.E. 416, 417 (N.Y. 1895) (cre-
ating the employment-at-will doctrine for New York State); Beermann & Singer, supra
note 41, at 987 (noting that courts created employment-at-will and, thus, they logi-
cally cannot wait for legislatures to correct the injustices that follow from the at-will
doctrine).
68. See Petermann, 344 P.2d at 28 (denying that managers can fire workers for
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reluctant to develop the law defining "wrong" motives,' relying upon
legislatures to establish the scope of exceptions to the at-will doctrine:'
Hence, in general, the law protects a worker from discharge for at-
tempting to improve the workplace only if the legislature has foreseen
and validated the need for the particular improvement that the worker
initiated.7 For example, the court protected a worker who refused to
misrepresent product test results where a statute clearly prohibited such
misrepresentation r Similarly, the court protected a worker in reporting
unhealthful radiation levels where a statute expressly prohibited punish-
ing workers for reporting safety violations0 Nonetheless, because there
are any number of "wrong" motives for firing workers, the legislature
generally fails to provide adequate protection against "wrong" motives
for firing"
refusing to commit perjury).
69. See Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 380 (Cal. 1988) (refusing
to expand the definition of "wrong motives" to include firing a worker for following
the firm's internal procedures and regulations).
70. See Dynan v. Rocky Mountain Fed. Say. and Loan, 792 P.2d 631, 639-40
(Wyo. 1990) (looking to federal and state statutes to ascertain public policy that de-
fines wrong motives for firing). The court concluded that firing a worker for refusing
to make a bad loan was not in violation of any law and thus, denied the plaintiff a
cause of action. Id.
71. See Bordell v. General Elec. Co., 564 N.Y.S.2d 802, 805 (App. Div. 1990)
(granting a cause of action where a health professional was fired for reporting un-
healthy radiation levels); Gary Minda & Katie R. Raab, Time for an Unjust Dismissal
Statute in New York, 54 BROOK. L. REv. 1137, 1138-40 (1989) (suggesting that rather
than formulating exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine, the legislature should
repeal the at-will rule and require the manager to have a valid business reason for
firing a worker). Id.
72. See Dateline: Denver, UPI, July 25, 1981 available in LEXIS. Nexis Library,
Archives File (recounting engineer Lorenz's claim that he was fired for discovering
faults in the testing procedures for materials used in the attachment between the
booster-rocket and the shuttle-craft in the space-shuttle program); Martin Marietta
Corp. v. Lorenz, 823 P.2d 100, 111 (Colo. 1992) (granting a wrongful discharge
cause of action to engineer Lorenz on a claim of being fired for refusing a manage-
ment command to misrepresent testing deficiencies where such misrepresentation would
violate federal law).
73. Bordell, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 805.
74. Minda & Raab, supra note 71, at 1183-84. The New York legislature devel-
oped legislation to protect whistleblowers based on extensive hearings on situations
requiring worker protection. lei However, during a four-year period following passage
of that legislation, only two whistleblowing situations fit the legislative criteria and in
both cases a cause of action was denied. Il
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C. LIMITATIONS ON THE MANAGER'S ACTIONS IN FIRING A WORKER
While protection against wrongful discharge limits the manager's
permissible motives for firing,75 the tort of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress76 may further limit the manager's treatment of the work-
er,' including the manager's method of firing.78 Under a claim of in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress, the manager's motive is rele-
vant only to show that the manager intended the emotional distress that
was caused.79 Proof of the manager's motive for firing, however, fails
to satisfy the test for outrageous conduct, even if the motive for firing
appears outrageous.' "The mere act of firing an employee, even if
wrongfully motivated, does not transgress the bounds of socially tolera-
ble behavior,"8' which an actionable claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress requires.' Furthermore, even if the firing causes de-
monstrable harm to the worker, the worker must still prove the
manager's intent and foreknowledge of the likelihood that harm would
75. See Madani v. Kendall Ford, Inc., 818 P.2d 930, 933 (Or. 1991) (noting that
the lower court failed to draw a necessary "distinction between wrongful discharge,
which focuses on the reason for termination, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress, which focuses on the manner of termination").
76. Id. at 933. To state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress,
the worker must show that: I) the manager intended to inflict emotional distress on
the worker, 2) the manager caused emotional distress to the worker; and 3) the
manager's actions exceeded the bounds of socially tolerable conduct. Id.
77. See Mellaly v. Eastman Kodak Co., 597 A.2d 846, 848 (Conn. Super. Ct.
1991) (granting a cause of action to a worker where the manager knew of the
worker's alcoholism and, based upon that knowledge, taunted and harassed the worker
and told the worker to "go get drunk").
78. See Tandy Corp. v. Bone, 678 S.W.2d 312, 316-18 (Ark. 1984) (holding the
employer liable where the worker's reaction to stress and request for Valium put the
manager on notice that the worker was not "of ordinary temperament" during the
investigation preceding the firing).
79. Mandani, 818 P.2d, at 934-35.
80. See id. at 932 (denying a cause of action for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress even if the worker could show that the firing was punishment for three
times refusing to obey the manager's command to "to pull down his pants, and ex-
pose his buttocks, testicles, and penis" in a public place, in violation of city and
county ordinances, but where the manager's manner in executing the firing was "ordi-
nary").
81. L at 934.
82. See id. at 935 (asserting that stating a valid claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress requires pleading that an intolerable act caused the injury) (citing
with approval Brewer v. Erwin, 600 P.2d 398 (Or. 1989)).
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result.' Thus, despite the potential applicability of tort law, the burden
of proof is such that the law provides little protection for workers who
attempt to improve the quality or efficiency of the workplace.
D. LIMITATIONS ON THE MANAGER'S RIGHT TO CONTROL
SPEECH IN THE WORKPLACE
Despite the importance of information that the worker may provide to
the public, the First Amendment does not protect workers from em-
ployer actions that may restrain the worker's efforts to inform the pub-
lic.' Only where the worker can argue that state action exists,' for
instance, where the worker's employer is the government, is a court
likely to grant First Amendment protection." Thus, the First Amend-
ment provides little protection against the hazards of employment-at-will
if the worker attempts to correct the workplace or serve the public in-
terest.
83. See Kentucky Fried Chicken Nat'l Mgmt. v. Vethersby, 607 A.2d 8, 24 (Nd.
1992) (holding that a worker's nervous breakdown on being fired did not qualify for
intentional infliction of emotional distress because the manager did not have construc-
tive notice of the worker's "emotional makeup and vulnerability").
84. Matthew L. Wald, Questions Raised About the Safety of Nay Reactors, N.Y.
Tis, Jan. 1, 1991, at Al (quoting a senator's claim that public scrutiny was neces-
sary to compel secret decision makers to be realistic about *problems of safety and
nuclear waste).
85. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 520 (1976) (declaring that the First
Amendment does not protect speech on private property where there is no state ac-
tion); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 560 (1972) (permitting restrictions on
speech by the owner of a shopping center on the grounds that the shopping center
did not perform state functions and thus state action was missing); Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 450 (1969) (applying First Amendment protection, as incorporat-
ed by the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, to prohibit the state prosecu-
tion of speech which merely "advocated" violent action); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S.
3, 11-12 (1883) (limiting the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment to state action).
"Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the amendment."
Id. at 11.
86. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977);
Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
87. Freeman v. McKellar, 792 F. Supp. 733 (1992) (granting a First Amendment
and Fourteenth Amendment claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 where a city government
manager fired a worker for testifying to a grand jury). To qualify for protection, the
worker had to show that there was state action by the manager in firing, that the
speech was of concern to the public, and that the public concern outweighed the
manager's legitimate interest in controlling the worker's speech. Id. at 737-39.
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II. ATTEMPTS TO "BREAK UP" COMMAND-MANAGEMENT:
THE FORMER SOVIET UNION
A. DECENTRALIZING THE DECISION MAKING
In April 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev, then General Secretary of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, introduced perestroika, in part as
an attempt to make the Soviets competitive in world markets88 by
broadening participation in workplace decision making. 9 The new laws
placed decision making responsibilities not only on local managers, but
also on workers.' Under perestroika, the state provided incentives and
protections" to encourage workers to uncover managers' mistakes or
malfeasance.' While perestroika might have hastened the demise of the
Soviet Union,' this decentralization continues in Russia under Boris
88. See YELTSIN, supra note 4, at 139 (describing Gorbachev's decision to initi-
ate perestroika within the then existing Soviet command system). One month after the
Politburo promoted him to General Secretary, Gorbachev announced the program of
perestroika ("restructuring"). Id. Gorbachev, by continuing the totalitarian tradition,
could have successfully postponed facing the political and economic problems in the
Soviet Union for his lifetime. Id. Gorbachev maintained that perestroika was "neces-
sary and inevitable" because of the high cost and low quality of Soviet production
compared with the cost and quality of production in other developed nations.
GORBACHEV, supra note 3, at 5-7.
89. See GORBACHEV, supra note 3, at 14-15 (declaring the changes that
perestroika would bring to the Soviet Union). Perestroika included removing the re-
strictions and bans on worker objections and suggestions. Id. at 15.
90. See GORBACHEV, supra note 3, at 33-34 (noting that, before perestroika,
workers were not made a part of decision making to the extent necessary for a
healthy socialist society). Gorbachev intended that workers at all levels, "from
shopfloor worker to minister" would "attain all their democratic rights and learn to
use them in a habitual, competent, and responsible manner." Id. at 42-3.
91. See GORBACHEV, supra note 3, at 84, 89 (calling for the right of workers to
elect their managers); Soviet Law on Cooperatives, supra note 5, arts. 13-14 (estab-
lishing the rights and duties of membership and employment in cooperatives and
guaranteeing each member of a cooperative one vote in the election of management).
92. See GORBACHEV, supra note 3, at 42-43 (asserting that restructuring extended
to workplaces, as well as to other areas of society, where if subordinates exercised
their right to object and if managers responded appropriately to the objections, prob-
lems causing concern could be tackled before the difficulties intensified).
93. See Francis X. Clines, End of the Soviet Union; Gorbachev Plans to Give
Up Power to Yeltsin Today, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 25, 1991, at Al (describing the disin-
tegration of the Soviet Union and the formation of eleven independent republics,
loosely associated in a confederation dominated by Russia as the strongest and richest
nation).
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Yeltsin,' and might yet succeed in making Russia competitive in world
markets."
If perestroika represents a "restructuring" of the pre-1985 Soviet econ-
omy,' then command-management represents the social and economic
order that perestroika aimed to dismantle." Though not formalized by
constitution or statute," command-management was the very essence of
the Soviet hierarchical command structure.' Under this structure, the
General Secretary of the Communist Party controlled the nation's indus-
trial complex, much as would a Chief Executive Officer in a Western
corporation."° Under command-management, which Soviet courts rein-
94. See VLADaiR SOLOVYOV & ELENA KLEPIKOVA, BORIS YELTSIN: A POUT-
CAL BIOGRAPHY 26-27 (1992) (portraying Russia as continuing the tradition of the
former Soviet Union, including the perestroika program).
95. See Louis Uchitelle, Russian Auto Maker Follows a Survival Blueprint: Ex-
ports, N.Y. TMIEs, July 23, 1992, at Al (describing the transition of a state-owned
manufacturing enterprise to a privately-held corporation and noting the gamble of
devoting limited investment resources to develop a product with competitive quality
and price for export). But see Michael Dobbs, In Russian Heartland, Post-Reform Life
Is Bleak, WASH. PosT, Aug. 9, 1992, at A25 (describing the uncertainty in the transi-
tion to a market economy in one urban area where the first private farmers complain
of rising prices after the removal of price controls and express a preference for the
days of "stagnation" under hard-fine Communist rule).
96. See YELTSIN, supra note 4, at 139 (describing Mikhail Gorbachev's rise to
power as General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and recount-
ing Gorbachev's announcement of perestroika as a "restructuring" of Soviet society to
improve the quality and efficiency of consumer-goods production); Report by
Gorbachev, (Moscow home service, Apr. 23, 1985), available in LEXIS. Nexis Li-
brary, ONIM File (announcing the goal of improving the quality and efficiency of
production by stimulating worker initiative through incentives for improvements).
97. See Mortimer B. Zuckerman & Douglas Stanglin, 'There Is No Way We Can
Turn Back', U.S. NEvs & WORLD REP., Dec. 2, 1991, at 64 (interview with Mikhail
Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union) (summa-
rizing Gorbachev's description of command-management as the inefficient process that
perestroika restructured).
98. See OLIMPIAD S. IOFFE & PETER B. MAGGS, THE SOVIET ECoxowic Sys-
TEM: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 106 (1987) (explaining that Soviet law does not describe
the organizing principles of Soviet production because Soviet leaders preserved their
freedom to manage by decree).
99. See GORBACHEV, supra note 3, at 97-98 (reviewing the role of the modem
Communist Party in bringing about a "command-economy system of management"
where managers made decisions without participation by the workers whom the deci-
sions affected).
100. JEROME A. BARRON ET AL, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY
14 (3d ed. 1987) (noting that "the Soviet Union functions much like a modem corpo-
ration").
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forced,"'1 every Soviet citizen was a worker"e forced to obey manag-
ers, who could coerce obedience with impunity by threatening to
fire,"°' demote,"°' or imprison" those who disobeyed. Doctors,
scientists, and artists all were mere workers under the command-manage-
ment of a state agency and manager."°
According to Soviet advocates of reform, command-management frus-
trated attempts by workers and managers to improve production quality
and efficiency. 1°" Centralized planning under command-management
encouraged local managers to behave inefficiently." s Because workers
could advance in the hierarchy only by obeying command-management
101. See Christopher Osakwe, Equal Protection of Law in Soviet Constitutional
Law and Theory - A Comparative Analysis, 59 TUL. L. REV. 974, 974-75 (1985)
(describing the abstinence of Soviet courts from forming public policy). Soviet courts
only administered and enforced laws made by the legislative and executive branches
of government. Id.
102. See KONST. SSSR art. 60 (1977), translated in ARYEH L. UNGER, CONSTITU-
TIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE USSR: A GUIDE TO THE SOVIET CONSTITUTIONS 232,
239 (1982) (assigning each citizen a duty to work productively); IOFFE & MAGOS,
supra note 98, at 53 (stating that all Soviet citizens were employed by the state,
except those working at minor jobs such as priests and baby-sitters).
103. See AGANBEGYAN, supra note 1, at 137-38 (relating the firing of a scientist
for objecting to the decision of the President of the Agricultural Academy to end the
study of biology in the Soviet Union).
104. See AGANBEGYAN, supra note 1, at 117 (reporting an economist's transfer to
a position in metallurgical studies as punishment for exploring methods of balancing
the national economy).
105. See AGANBEGYAN, supra note 1, at 116-17 (recounting the arrest of a tech-
nician for comparing economic sectors of the United States with comparable sectors
in the Soviet Union in defiance of management opposition to such comparisons).
106. See IOFFE & MAGGS, supra note 98, at 53 (noting that every significant
employer was under the direct or indirect command of a government agency);
Tchetvemina, supra note 2, at 207 ("Intellectual workers were reduced to fulfilling
administrative orders as state employees. ... ).
107. See GORBACHEV, supra note 4, at 5 (describing the stifling effect of com-
mand-management attempts to improve production).
108. See GORBACHEV, supra note 4, at 7 (noting that, under command-manage-
ment, local managers obeyed their bosses unquestioningly, even when evidence sug-
gested the bosses were wrong). Under command-management, even scientific discus-
sion became servile. Id. at 7-8. When the Central Planning Committee established a
head count on cows as part of the plan, farmers responded to the plan by keeping
non-producing cows that any economical farmer would have otherwise butchered,
because the plan included a head count on cows but did not call for tallying gallons
of milk produced or the cost of feeding the cows. AGANBEGYAN, supra note 1, at
131.
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directives,"° initiative atrophied"' and industry declined."'
B. CREATING THE WORKER'S DUTY TO IMPROVE THE WORKPLACE
Soviet courts could have interpreted existing Soviet labor codes rea-
sonably to protect workers against unjust firing or punishment."' None-
theless, the courts allowed managers to retaliate against workers as a
"political discharge,"" which legislation did not authorize."' The
109. See YELTSIN, supra note 4, at 82 (describing the difficulty of "getting things
done" under command-management where underlings attend only to the appearance of
obedience rather than taking responsibility for completing a task).
110. See Zuckerman & Stanglin, supra note 97, 110, at 64 (reporting Gorbachev's
view that command-management eliminated natural worker perceptions of the
workplace as a challenge to get a better reward for personal initiative).
111. See GORBACHEV, supra note 3, at 5 (noting that industry was not rationally
organized). Distorted standards resulted in high praise for workers or enterprises that
expended the most labor. Id. The workers at the base of the hierarchy realized the
corrections that were necessary, but the workers had no means to influence the deci-
sion makers. Id. at 7.
112. See Kodeks Zakonov o Trude RSFSR [Russian Code of Laws on Labor], art.
29 (delineating Soviet Labor Code protection for workers); IOFFE & MACOS, supra
note 98, at 170 (prohibiting managers from firing workers for reasons not explicitly
enumerated in the Labor Code). Workers of indefinite term were considered to be
working under an indefinite term contract. This indefinite term contract did not need
to be in writing because the Labor Code already specified its terms. Russian Code of
Laws on Labor, supra, art. 18; IOF & MACGS, supra note 98, at 166. The Labor
Code limited the allowed grounds for discharge to the following: elimination of the
worker's position because of reorganization, unsuitability of the worker to the position.
repeated breach of duties after previous disciplining, unexcused absence, inability to
work because of disability for longer than four months, reinstatement of worker previ-
ously assigned to the position, and appearing at work in a drunken state. Russian
Code of Laws on Labor, supra, art. 33; IOFFE & MAGOGS. supra note 98, at 170-71.
Normally, the approval of the worker's trade union was required before a manager
fired a worker. See GORBACHEV, supra note 3, at 99 (stating that a court of law
would automatically reinstate a worker if a manager fired him without approval of the
worker's trade union). However, trade unions surrendered to command-management
and trade union officials did as managers commanded. See id. (reproaching the trade
unions for "pandering to managers"). Hence, the trade unions offered workers little
protection for improving the workplace. See id. at 100 (asserting that trade unions had
the right to protect workers in making legitimate objections to manager decisions,
admonishing trade unions for failing to protect workers, and asserting that workers
needed protection even under socialism).
113. IOFFE & MAGS, supra note 98, at 173. A manager or a scholar could be
fired in retaliation under expedited procedures. Id. Other workers could be fired in
retaliation by gathering or fabricating infractions of work rules or by contriving a
reduction in force. Id. Even though published legislation did not authorize "political
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range of retaliations available to managers effectively silenced the objec-
tions of workers and secured obedience115
Within production facilities, the worker did not seek improve-
ments."6 Advocates of reform insisted that this disinterest was due to
the lack of a property interest in the workplace."' Reform advocates
reasoned that since managers could fire or transfer workers for no rea-
son or for a bad reason,"' the worker had no expectation of benefiting
from any improvement."9 Without protection against command-manage-
ment capriciousness, workers simply obeyed managers' instructions'
without examining their reasonableness.' Thus, workers attempted to
discharge," the courts did not interfere with such terminations, Id.
114. IOFFE & MAGCs, supra note 98, at 173.
115. See ANDREI D. SAKHAROV, MY COUNTRY AND THE WORLD 29-30 (Guy V.
Daniels trans., 1975) (characterizing the Soviet worker as obedient to "immediate and
remote superiors" in order to survive).
116. See AGANBEGYAN, supra note 1, at 151-52 (noting that methods of manage-
ment based on commands did bring stability, but command-management also brought
stagnation because it prevented workers from providing useful information to manage-
ment resulting in informed decisions).
117. See Vladimir Shcherbakov, The Labour Market in the USSR: Problems and
Perspectives, in IN SEARCH OF FLEXIBILrrY, supra note 2, at 19 (expressing the offi-
cial opinion that high efficiency in production will require legal authorization that a
worker owns the ability to perform a certain job). Without a property interest in the
ability to perform a certain job, the worker becomes irresponsible in the workplace
and becomes capable of only one service: obedience. Id. at 24. Not rewarding and
not protecting the worker's skills creates a low quality worker. Id. at 26. Accordingly,
economic recovery requires that the workers own a property-like guarantee of return
for the investments of skills development and improving output. Id. at 27.
118. See supra notes 103-13 (reciting retaliatory firings, punishments, and per-
ceived consequences); IOFFE & MAGGS, supra note 98, at 174 (summarizing the pro-
cedures for resolving disputes between manager and worker). Executives and scholars
had no protection against being fired or punished by managers, and workers had no
protection from being fired or punished for political reasons. Id. at 174-75.
119. See AGANBEGYAN, supra note 'I, at 60-61 (comparing production and required
manpower in two gold mines). In the gold mine where the workers had a property
interest in improvements made to the workplace, "there was no director, no deputy,
no special technician." Id. The workers improved their skills by their own effort
thereby reducing manpower costs when there was a guarantee of return for the invest-
ment. Id.
120. See GORBACHEV, supra note 3, at 86 (noting that paying a worker without
rewarding that worker's cultivation of productive workplace skills resulted in the
worker saying "let the bosses have the headache").
121. See GORBACHEV, supra note 3, at 83-84 (stating that the lack of a propri-
etary role in the workplace made workers withhold useful opinions). Without a propri-
etary role, the worker became dormant. Id. at 15. As a result, quality and efficiency
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raise neither the level of their own performances, nor those of fellow
workers." Furthermore, workers stopped pressing for scientific and
technological development in the workplace, except when following
the instructions of management." In short, having no property inter-
est,"6 the worker viewed the workplace as the manager's responsibili-
ty1
26
C. PROTECTION FOR WORKERS ATEmPTING TO
IMPROVE THE WORKPLACE
Soviet and Russian reformers hypothesized that command-management
failed by centralizing too much of the decision-making.'" Conse-
quently, the reformers attempted to create a system of laws that autho-
rized" and protected decentralized decision making." Additionally,
fell. Id. at 7.
122. See Vladimir Veretennikov, Wage Differentials: The Trade Union View, in IN
SEARCH OF FLExmILrrY, supra note 2, at 221, 225 (noting that pay incentives to
improve quality and efficiency are more effective where each worker and each man-
ager participates in assigning and evaluating the other members of the team rather
than following the decisions of a single command manager).
123. See Tchetvernina, supra note 6, at 204-05 (attributing the lack of technologi-
cal innovation under the Stalinist model to workers having no property interest in the
workplace to provide a basis for responsibility in making improvements).
124. See Tchetvemina, supra note 6, at 205 (describing managers as relying upon
"thoughtless obedience" and workers as functioning like cogs in a machine).
125. See Tchetvernina, supra note 6, at 213-14 (noting that making workers re-
sponsible for a property interest in the workplace is more effective than pay incen-
tives for increasing the efficiency of production).
126. See Roy D. Laird, The USSR's Food Crisis, CHRISTIAN Sci. MoNrroR, July
26, 1990, at 19 (proposing that command-management, in addition to realizing indus-
trialization through central planning, also changed the mindset of the worker to expect
that better workplace performance would not improve earnings for the worker).
127. See John N. Hazard, Prospects for a New Type of Federation, in BEYO D
PEREMS OIKA: OPTIONS FOR A NEW SOVIET UNION 6 (Laurence J. Aurbach ed., 1991)
(validating Soviet attempts to improve efficiency through decentralization, and noting
that large, private corporations in the Vest also decentralize to improve efficiency).
128. See AGANBEGYAN, supra note I, at 167 (arguing that workers must have au-
thority to influence workplace decisions, and asserting that the workers' authority must
be guaranteed by power that is not dependent on any liberal grants of authority from
managers making decisions behind closed doors).
129. See Viktor Demidenko & Mikhail M. Write, Minister's Order Canceled on
Workers' Demand, TASS, Dec. 29, 1987, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, TASS
File (describing an implementation of reform law which afforded protection and autho-
rization to the workers in a glass-works plant to reinstate by majority vote the local
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the new laws granted workers the right to information about the
enterprise." Maintaining some centralized decision making, the 1987
Law on State Enterprises 3' authorized local managers of factories and
other enterprises to make economic decisions based on the local
managers' view of the market.' The workers, however, were given
the right to elect the managers, the foremen, and the team leaders by
majority vote.' In support of the reforms, the courts announced their
readiness to enforce the worker rights sections of the Law on State
Enterprises."
The 1988 Law on Cooperatives" provided authorization" and pro-
tection'37 for workers who attempted to improve product quality or
pricing' by competing directly with state enterprises.' Any group
director after he was fired by the oversight ministry).
130. See AGANBEGYAN, supra note 1, at 167 (noting that under glasnost, or
"openness," the worker has a right to be informed so that the worker can provide an
appropriate influence on the eventual decision); Soviet Law on Cooperatives, supra
note 5, art. 13(1)(4) (granting members of all cooperatives the right "to obtain infor-
mation on any question of the cooperative activities and operations").
131. Law of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the State Enterprises
(Associations), 26 Vedomosti SSSR, Item 385 (1987) [hereinafter Soviet Law on State
Enterprises], translated in 27 SoviEr STATUTES & DECISIONS (1990).
132. See Soviet Parliament Ends Session, TASS, June 30, 1987, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, TASS File (highlighting new laws passed by the Soviet legis-
lature, including the Law of State Enterprises). The Soviet Law on State Enterprises
gave workers and managers at plants and factories certain rights to make economic
decisions based on the market viewed by the managers and workers. Id.
133. See Soviet Parliament Adopts Law on the State Enterprise, TASS, June 30,
1987, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, TASS File (announcing that, under the 1987
Law on State Enterprises, workers would elect senior managers as well as heads of
production shops, foremen, and team leaders).
134. See Sovetskaya Rossia on Legislation Reform in USSR, TASS, Dec. 23, 1987,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, TASS File (reporting comments by the Russian
Minister of Justice and the Russian Chairman of the Supreme Court verifying that the
courts were willing to apply the Law on State Enterprises to protect worker rights to
self-management).
135. Soviet Law on Cooperatives, supra note 5.
136. See Soviet Law on Cooperatives, supra note 5, art. 1, para. 4 (declaring that
cooperative enterprises are a legitimate part of the "national business complex").
137. See Soviet Law on Cooperatives, supra note 5, art. 13, para. 1 (establishing
the rights of members, including the rights to obtain employment, participate in man-
agement, recommend improvements, and receive earnings in proportion to their labor
contribution and their investment contribution).
138. See Soviet Law on Cooperatives, supra note 5, art. 1, para. 2 (stating that
cooperatives, and the form of privately held property implied, were lawful and desir-
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of three or more workers'" who were over sixteen-years-old could
form a cooperative to compete with state enterprises. "' The Law guar-
anteed each member of the cooperative the right to be employed by the
cooperative,4 ' and the right to participate in management.'" The
members also had the right to select managers and directors by majority
vote.'" Finally, an employee of a state enterprise could join one, but
no more than one, cooperative without interference from the manager of
the state enterprise. 4 '
Furthermore, the 1991 Law on Employment addressed dislocations
likely to result from workplace reforms. The prior Soviet emphasis on
full employment encouraged enterprises to hire more workers than they
required, creating conditions of over-employment and low productivi-
ty- By creating free market areas of competition, the Soviet legisla-
tors attempted to force workers to migrate from low-productivity
workplaces to high-productivity workplaces.' In making this transition,
workers required training and preparation for the more competitive work
and consequently faced significant risks of financial loss.'" The Law
able for the purpose of bringing higher quality goods to the market at lower cost).
139. See Soviet Law on Cooperatives, supra note 5, ar. 1, para. 5 (stating that
cooperatives, and the resulting compensation incentives for high labor productivity, are
designed to provide improvements on state enterprise production through competition);
AGANBEGYAN, supra note 1, at 2 (outlining the transition redundancy in production
which created incentives for privately owned cooperatives to compete with state enter-
prises for the same goods and services).
140. See Soviet Law on Cooperatives, supra note 5, art. 11, par. I (setting the
minimum membership in a cooperative).
141. See Soviet Law on Cooperatives, supra note 5, art. 12, para. 1 (setting the
lower age limit for membership in a cooperative).
142. Soviet Law on Cooperatives, supra note 5, art. 13, para. 1.
143. See Soviet Law on Cooperatives, supra note 5, art. 13, par. 1 (declaring
that a member's rights to management participation shall include voting for the direc-
tors and officers of the cooperative).
144. Soviet Law on Cooperatives, supra note 5, art. 13, para. 1.
145. Soviet Law on Cooperatives, supra note 5, art. 12, par. 2.
146. See V.E. Tokman, Preface to IN SEARCH OF FLEXIBILTY, supra note 2, at v,
vi (paraphrasing the prevailing view that over-employment caused low productivity in
the Soviet Union and that consequently, raising productivity required releasing excess
workers from current production to other manufacturing activities, such as increasing
the production of consumer goods).
147. See Mikhail Bermant & Marina Feonova., Training and Retraining: The Link
With Employment, in IN SEARCH OF FLEXIBILrrY, supra note 2, at 329 (estimating the
occupational changes to involve 50 million workers by the year 2000).
148. See Bermant & Feonova, supra note 147, at 323 (reviewing the resources
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on Employment'49 aimed to minimize these risks and to ease the transi-
tion '5  from low-productivity workplaces to high-productivity
workplaces.'
Furthermore, new law under perestroika explicitly prohibited race, sex,
and age discrimination in hiring practices during the migrations caused
by new market forces.' Finally, the law created economic incentives
for employers in hiring workers with disabilities."
D. DEMOCRACY TO IMPROVE THE DECISION MAKING
The principles of the laws on enterprises, cooperatives, and employ-
ment depended largely on worker ambition." The legislators sought to
encourage workers to take entrepreneurial risks to prepare them for
challenges from international market forces." The reformers praised
initially available for upgrading worker skills in the transition to a market economy).
149. Basic Principles of the Legislation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
and its Republics on Employment of the Population, Jan. 15, 1991, translated in LAB.
LAW DOcs., 1991/2, at 35 [hereinafter Soviet Law on Employment].
150. See Soviet Law on Employment, supra note 149, art. 26 (specifying the
financial assistance available to discharged workers, including severance pay, unem-
ployment and medical benefits, and training).
151. See Valeri F. Kolosov, The New Employment Policy in the USSR, in IN
SEARCH OF FLEXIBILrrY, supra note 2, at 45, 47 (noting the legislative concern for
release of workers from low-productivity workplaces in formulating the 1991 Law on
Employment). Soviet legislators intended to provide training, incentives, and counseling
for released workers to prepare them for high-productivity employment. Id.
152. See KONST. SSSR art. 34 (declaring legal equality for all Soviet citizens irre-
spective of origin, social position, race, national origin, sex, education, attitude to
religion, type and nature of occupation, and place of residence), translated in UNGER,
supra note 102, at 240; Soviet Law on Employment, supra note 149, § 4 (legislating
equal opportunity in employment irrespective of race, sex, attitude to religion, age,
political convictions, nationality, and social status).
153. Soviet Law on Employment, supra note 149, art. 6 (specifying tax incentives
and set asides to guarantee employment assistance to disabled workers).
154. See Shcherbakov, supra note 117, at 37 (stating that perestroika reform in-
tended to make workers responsible for rectifying poor management, lack of regula-
tion, and insensitivity to market processes).
155. See Soviet Law on Cooperatives, supra note 5, art. 4, para. 2 (establishing
that cooperatives would operate on principles of self-financing whereby the profits
from operation would improve the standard of living of the cooperative members
while simultaneously solving society's problems and providing high-efficiency produc-
tion of goods and services); Shcherbakov, supra note 117, at 41 (stating that, while
there was no consensus on the role and effectiveness of collectives, there was oppor-
tunity in collectives for worker "initiative and entrepreneurship").
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critical and responsible workers rather than obedient ones' because
workers with some independence were more flexible, more productive,
and required less management overhead."
Although these laws aimed to dismantle command-management, they
actually manifested command-management.' Accordingly, Gorbachev
feared that if perestroika originated from his office, then the reform
would depend on command-management for survival." He observed
that the reform would be reversible as long as it relied on the authority
of the General Secretary."w That is, a subsequent return to a command
hierarchy easily could originate from the office of a future General Sec-
retary.
161
In Gorbachev's view, however, democratizing the workplace would
provide an irreversible departure from old command-management practic-
es. " He reasoned that after the reform had secured a competitive
workplace, then political democracy could follow as a secondary ef-
fect.16
156. See GORBACHEV, supra note 3, at 16-17 (noting that perestroika intended to
raise the level of responsibility by inducing workers to act according to their con-
science).
157. See Shcherbakov, supra note 117, at 24-27 (describing procedures for making
workers less dependent on management oversight). Perestroika incentives protecting
the worker's property interest in the workplace intended to raise the worker's sense of
efficiency and willingness to assume responsibility. Id.
158. See GORBACHEV, supra note 3, at 42 (acknowledging that perestroika was a
revolution from above initiated by high level Communist Party leadership); YELTStN,
supra note 4, at 227 (stating that the reform would not make a significant difference
until workers acted from personal power instead of waiting for direction from manag-
ers).
159. See GORBACHEV, supra note 3, at 42 (asserting that the reforms would have
little chance at success without strong popular backing).
160. See GORBACHEV, supra note 3, at 43 (observing that if a reform requires
intimidation by the authorities then the reform is weak and loses direction). In
Gorbachev's view, popular resistance against a reform indicates a likely problem that
hinders success. Id.
161. See GORBACHEV, supra note 3, at 43 (noting the common perception that
new Russian leaders construct programs to blame unresolved problems on the former
leaders while no actual change takes place); AGANBEGYAN, supra note I, at 110
(admitting that perestroika, in many ways, resembled prior reforms that command-
management had initiated and then later reversed).
162. See GORBACHEV, supra note 3, at 43 (discussing reversibility of previous re-
forms in comparison to perestroika based on democratic principles).
163. See GORBACHEV, supra note 3, at 13 (stating that the primary concern objec-
tive of perestroika aimed to improve economic conditions); id. at 21-22 (conceding
1993]
336 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y [VOL. 9:1
Alternatively, some of Gorbachev's advisors argued that democracy
should include the political process,'" and Yeltsin, the dissident in
those days, contended that democracy of the political process should
precede democracy of the workplace." In any case, the notion of
workplace democracy did not necessarily include political democracy.'"
Workplace democracy was merely a mechanism for better decision mak-
ing to promote competitive quality and pricing. 6  In essence,
workplace democracy was a matter of economics, not politics."
III. COMPELLING WORKER OBEDIANCE: THE FORMER
SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES
A. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM: FIRED FOR DOING THE JOB
Valid controversies can arise between the worker and the manager
regarding sound workplace policies and practices, as well as job du-
ties.'" How one defines the job depends upon one's perceptions of the
that ultimately the perestroika reforms would spread to include popular democratic
control of politics and ethics). When comparing perestroika to Western democracy,
Gorbachev believed that the Western nations did not practice genuine democracy
because the workers did not elect the managers and managers did not tolerate valid
criticisms. ld. at 113.
164. See AGANBEGYAN, supra note 1, at 166-67 (describing activities in prepara-
tion for democratizing the political process to give citizens the ability to establish
priorities and control public funds).
165. YELTSIN, supra note 4, at 248.
166. See YELTSIN, supra note 4, at 170-71, 248 (noting that workers were begin-
ning to assert decision making rights in the workplace, but that these democratic re-
forms did not extend to political areas).
167. See GORBACHEV, supra note 3, at 5, 7, 13 (recalling the inefficiency of
socialism which produced a deterioration in quality of goods and services).
168. See Guy Standing, Towards Economic Democracy and Labour Flexibility? An
Era of Experimentation, in IN SEARCH OF FLEXMBILrrY, supra note 2, at 389-95 (ana-
lyzing the perestroika programs in terms of political, economic, and industrial demo-
cratic principles). Economic democracy consisted of Soviet efforts to provide workers
with wage incentives which corresponded to achievements in improved quality and
reduced costs. Id. at 390. Industrial democracy embodied an effort to improve produc-
tion decisions through authorizing and protecting workers in the process of affecting
management decisions. Id. at 394-95. Political democracy could survive only if the
economic infrastructure ensured a sufficient supply of goods and services that con-
sumers wanted. ld. at 389-90.
169. See Joseph Sensenbrenner, Quality Comes to City Hall, HARV. Bus. REV.,
Mar.-Apr. 1991, at 64, 68 (relating the controversial views of workers that redefined
the job of "maintenance" and contributed to improving the quality of city transporta-
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workplace and society,"7 the potential for profits or losses,"' and the
influences affecting productivity." Thus, worker and manager bring to
the controversy different views of the difficulties and possible solu-
tions.'" The commentators supporting employment-at-will characterize
the worker's views as mere reflections of self-interest with negligible
objective merit. 74 Gorbachev, on the other hand, in preparing to emu-
late the workplace efficiency of Germany and Japan noticed the funda-
mental necessity of worker solutions in achieving competitive quality
and efficiency.7"
Courts in the former Soviet Union"6 and in the United States'"
tion while cutting costs).
170. See ANDRai SAKHAROV, M Moms 216-17 (Richard Lourie trans., 1990)
(comparing a physicist's view with the view of his manager regarding the foreseeable
futility of resuming nuclear weapon testing); NIIuTA S. KHRUSHCHEV, KHRUSHCHEV
REMBERS: THE LAST TESTAMENT 68-71 (Strobe Talbott trans., 1974) (portraying a
manager's distrust of the physicist Sakharov who attempted to re-define an assigned
technical job as a political responsibility and task).
171. See John Thorbeck, The Turnaround Value of Values, HARV. Bus. REV., Jan.-
Feb. 1991, at 52, 57-60 (describing an entrepreneur who developed a high-quality
marketing strategy that conflicted with the managers' low-cost plan). The entrepreneur
contended that the managers were wasting the profitability of corporate resources. Id.
172. See AGANBEGYAN, supra note 1, at 144-46 (describing a manager's inability
to understand the influence and advantages of a subordinate's ideas for increasing
productivity).
173. See John S. Brown, Research That Reinvents the Corporation, HARV. Bus.
REV., Jan.-Feb. 1991, at 102, 108 (noting that management often over-looked the
practical knowledge of workers when attempting to cut costs).
174. See Epstein, supra note 9, at 974-76 (denying the objective value of a
worker's viewpoint and recognizing only competing self-interests in the negotiation
between worker and manager).
175. See GORBACHEV, supra note 3, at 67-69 (recognizing that each different
viewpoint among honest people "reflects some real aspects of life" worthy of manage-
ment consideration); AGANBEGYAN, supra note 1, at 83-86 (discussing the possibility
that inducing managers to consider the viewpoints of workers can revitalize a stag-
nating economy).
176. See Sovetskaya Rossia, supra note 134 (paraphrasing two Russian court
officials' statements that new legislation provided authority for courts to protect work-
ers in objecting to manager decisions); Supreme Soviet - Gorbachev's Speech, TASS.
Nov. 29, 1988, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, TASS File (explaining that pro-
tecting workers included ensuring that proposals to improve the workplace were not
suppressed by managers); N.I. Ryzhkov, Address to USSR Supreme Soviet on 29th
June, PRAVDA, June 30, 1987, 2d ed., at 1, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
BBCSWB File (giving an example of protection for workers in a roofing factory
where the supervisor issued an unreasonable order). Under the reform rules, subordi-
nates would have a legal right to object and reason with managers. Id.
177. See Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174, 180-82 (Pa. 1972)
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have noted the deficiency in protection for workers who dispute manag-
er decisions.' Although the worker might have implemented a reason-
able interpretation of company policy, 79 often courts would not provide
the worker with adequate protection; courts presumed that the manager's
view was more realistic than the worker's." Despite evidence that
such disagreements manifested a worker's unusual dedication to the job,
the court still refused to protect the worker who reasonably disagreed
with the manager merely to improve the workplace when there was no
issue of illegality or public safety.8
B. INTENDING TO COMPEL WORKERS TO OBEY
Policy in both the pre-1985 Soviet Union" and in the United
States" presumed that modem production required obedient workers.
(Roberts, J. dissenting) (stating that workers who perform their duty to warn managers
of relevant dangers are inadequately protected).
178. See Vella v. United Cerebral Palsy, Inc., 535 N.Y.S.2d 292, 294 (Sup. Ct.
1988) (denying a cause of action to a worker fired for objecting to a manager's di-
version of funds where such diversion would not explicitly violate a statute).
179. See Citizens State Bank of N.J. v. Libertelli, 521 A.2d 867, 869-70 (N.J.
Super. Ct. 1987) (holding that statutory and common law permit a board of directors
to fire a bank president who "insisted on following sound and lawful banking practic-
es and would not go along with the self-dealing improprieties of board members");
Kemper v. First Nat'l Bank, 418 N.E.2d 819, 821 (Ill. 1981) (upholding the interpre-
tation of a federal statute that allows a board of directors to dismiss a bank president
for buying stock in the bank).
180. See Rossi v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 489 A.2d 828, 836 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1981) (presuming a manager's view to be correct while refusing to consider the sub-
stance of a worker's objection to that view).
181. See Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 380 (Cal. 1988) (recog-
nizing that, although a worker may have a duty to report information relevant to a
manager's interest, the law does not protect a worker from being fired when meeting
that obligation).
182. See IOFFE & MAGGS, supra note 98, at 134 (stating that Soviet authorities,
like the tsars who preceded them, attempted to modernize society by force). Obedi-
ence provided the necessary coupling of worker activity to the centralized plan. Id.
When a national plan depends on obedience, high management attention is required.
Id. As long as manpower and natural resources were cheap, the more efficient meth-
ods based on initiative and competition were unnecessary. Id.
183. See Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834, 836 (Wis. 1983)
(holding that the manager requires the unrestricted power to manipulate the worker in
managing the workplace); Regina Austin, Employer Abuse, Worker Resistance, and the
Tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1, 38 (1988)
(arguing that an enterprise with job security provisions is more costly to operate and
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For Soviet policy makers, production management merely meant expand-
ing the crisis techniques that mobilized the nation for World War II.'"
Thus, central planners formulated the desired mix of military and con-
sumption goods for the next period.'" Workers at lower levels in the
hierarchy, including middle managers, followed the commands of superi-
ors.'" Even though the Soviet Union promoted full employment, dis-
obedience triggered punishment by demotion or firing.'" Though the
law technically prohibited firing or punishment without a valid rea-
son,"s the courts generally would presume that the manager acted rea-
sonably in a controversy with a worker, and thus would find for the
manager."s
Similarly, the practice in the United States of compelling worker
obedience developed from the industrial experience. In particular, en-
trepreneurial experts devised production lines for workers who performed
according to the direction of expert managers."* While unions argued
is less flexible than a work-place where the workers obey the commands of the man-
ager).
184. See GORBACHEV, supra note 3, at 32 (stating that centralized planning and
the associated command style of management was necessary for getting the nation
through wartime conditions).
185. See AGANBEGYAN, supra note 1, at 31-32 (describing the centralized planning
process which specifies by customer the products to produce).
186. See AGANBEGYAN, supra note 1, at 32-33 (portraying middle managers who
were forced to resort to illegal deals on the black market in order to satisfy the
orders of superiors). Even foolish commands were carried out regardless of the finan-
cial impact or the waste involved, Id. at 35. Goods were delivered to customers
whether or not the customers could use the product. Id. at 36.
187. See AGANBEGYAN, supra note 1, at 138 (stating that managers fired, dis-
graced, or jailed many scientists who disagreed with management decisions).
188. See Russian Code of Laws on Labor, art. 18 (stating the legal limitations on
the manager's right-to-fire), translated in IOFFE & MAGOS, supra note 98, at 166 &
n.42.
189. See IOFFE & MAGGS, supra note 98, at 70-71 (noting that by law, the state
owned all property). Any worker activity that deviated from the manager's command
risked criminal and civil liability for misappropriation of property. Id. Similarly, ex-
ceeding administrative authority risked prosecution as a violation of property laws. Id.
at 70. Fulfillment of the central plan was the principal criterion of performance re-
view. I. at 291. On the other hand, a worker's deviation from the manager's rules
risked prosecution as an injury to the economy. Id. at 290.
190. See LACEY, supra note 1, at 95-100 (describing the highest officer in the
corporation assembling a technical team of experts and personally tackling the techni-
cal details of prototype automobiles with intense efforts such as forty-two-hour work
stints). Technical experts developed all details of the production methods. Id. at 111-
14. Managers trained low-expertise workers to do routine jobs. Id. at 115.
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with managers over such matters as workers' share of profits, they did
not demand participation in efforts to identify and promote processes to
improve efficiency. 9' Thus, unionized workers were encouraged to
demonstrate neither creativity nor business initiative."
Though differing in historical origins, the policies of the pre-1985
Soviet Union 93 and the United States" depended upon the expertise
of managers and the obedience of workers. Neither nation considered
workers to have either managerial talent or entrepreneurial abilities. 9'
Both nations offered promotion from worker to manager for those who
exhibited talent," but the differentiation between managers and work-
ers was sharp." Managers gave orders; workers obeyed."9
191. WEILER, supra note 2, at 87, 132-33, 197, 295-96 (noting that unions have
pressed management for worker interests in wages and job security, but have not
proposed worker participation in management decisions). Instead, unions have isolated
their activities from management concerns. Id. Supervisors and managers are excluded
from union membership. Id. at 230. But see Clyde W. Summers, Industrial Democra-
cy: America's Unfulfilled Promise, 28 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 29, 34 (1979) (noting that
the original purpose of empowering unions, under the protections of the National
Labor Relations Act, was to establish democratic management of the workplace com-
parable to the democratic principles established for American government).
192. WEILER, supra note 2, at 295-96.
193. See IOFFE & MAGGS, supra note 98, at 3 (stating that the Soviet system is
dependent upon maintaining the political power of experts to command workers).
194. See WElLER, supra note 2, at 196-97 (characterizing American mass produc-
tion lines as a combination of technical experts giving commands and unskilled labor-
ers following orders).
195. See GORBACHEV, supra note 3, at 52-55 (arguing that suppressing conflicts of
opinion extinguished the initiative - and resourcefulness of Soviet workers); Brown,
supra note 173, at 103 (proposing that although corporations could modify procedures
in accordance with the innovations of workers to improve profitability, managers com-
monly disregard these insights).
196. See YELTSIN, supra note 4, at 46-53, 241 (describing the management promo-
tions of the young Yeltsin from an engineering background to becoming the first
elected president of the Russian Republic); LEE IACOCCA, IACOCCA: AN AUTOBIOGRA-
PHY 31, 100-01 (Bantam paperback ed. 1986) (1984) (describing lacocca's rise
through the ranks of Ford Motor Company from student engineer to president).
197. See YELTSIN, supra note 4, at 82 (describing the threats, pressure, and coer-
cion typical in a Soviet manager's treatment of workers); Levin, supra note 11 (not-
ing the hierarchical and authoritarian tradition of management in the automotive indus-
try). To improve the quality and cost of production, Ford Motor Company, in the late
1980's, had to fire those managers that would not listen to subordinates. Id. In this
restructuring, Ford was copying Japanese workplace management that de-emphasizes
the differentiation between workers and managers. WILLIAM B. GOULD, JAPAN'S RE-
SHAPING OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW 4 (1984).
198. See WEILER, supra note 2, at 196-97 (stating that American managers per-
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C. COURTS PROTECT ONLY WHAT THE COURTS PERCEIVE
In the United States and, before 1985, in the Soviet Union, the work-
er offered no significant value to the employer other than an ability to
obey commands." Reflecting this view, Soviet' and American
law"' failed to protect the worker in challenging the wisdom of man-
agement decisions. = Nonetheless, both American and Soviet laws did
provide some protection for worker interests that the courts per-
ceived.' For instance, courts and legislatures often were sympathetic
to workers who had fulfilled a duty to report illegal activities, and who
confronted employer retaliation as a result' But the courts simply did
not recognize the worker's interest in workplace-specific skills, in-
ceived worker obedience as a requirement for efficiency); IOFFE & MAGOS, supra
note 98, at 3 (summarizing the obedience required under Soviet command-manage-
ment).
199. See WILER, supra note 2, at 196-97 (stating that American managers per-
ceived worker obedience as a requirement for efficiency); IOFFE & MAGOS, supra
note 98, at 3 (summarizing the obedience required under Soviet command-manage-
ment).
200. See YELTSIN, supra note 4, at 82 (suggesting the typical treatment that Soviet
workers received in the absence of legal protections against manager retaliation).
201. Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174, 181-82 (Pa. 1972). The
court asserted that the law did not recognize any social value in the worker's effort
to prevent injuries from defective steel piping. Id. On the contrary, the law recog-
nized the importance of managers obtaining obedience from their workers. Id.
202. See Epstein, supra note 9, at 956-57 (noting that in free bargaining between
the manager and worker, the manager's offer of wage represents the totality of value
for the worker's labor). Other than the terms of the contract, there is no interest that
requires protection by the state. Id. at 953-54.
203. See supra notes 47-58 and accompanying text (summarizing the protections
for which the American worker could bargain); supra note 112 and accompanying
text (summarizing the protections promised to the Russian worker not having a spe-
cific contract).
204. See Potter v. Village Bank of NJ., 543 A.2d 80, 87 (1988) (granting a cause
of action where the board of directors fired a bank president for reporting suspected
laundering of drug money).
205. See OLIvER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIRARCHIES: ANALYsS AND
ANTrrRUST IMPLICATIONs 64 (1975) (stating that a worker acquires specialized skills
that give that worker a value above the worth of an equivalent worker that is not
familiar with the workplace in question). These workplace-specific skills are such that
a worker cannot learn them in a classroom away from the workplace. Id. at 62.
Hence, a new worker must learn while performing the job during an initiation period.
Id at 63-64. The manager destroys these workplace-specific skills when he fwes the
worker. Epstein, supra note 9. at 974.
AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
stead recognizing only the employer's interest in those skills.2"
In allowing the manager a right to fire the worker without a valid
business reason, courts failed to perceive the fragile nature of the learn-
ing process in a modem production environment.2" That is, the modem
workplace routinely gives rise to situations that differ from the ordinary
circumstances for which the enterprise has developed successful respons-
es. As new competition may demand new tactics, so developing a suc-
cessful response to an unfamiliar workplace situation may require some
adaptation.2' Accordingly, uncertainty generally accompanies new op-
portunities, and worker and manager alike may feel stress.2" When a
206. See Epstein, supra note 9, at 970-74 (arguing that, since the employer bears
the essential cost of losing the worker, courts and government agencies should refrain
from interfering with the employer's judgment).
207. See Levin, supra note 11 (stating that Japanese competitiveness in quality and
price is dependent on a learning process in which managers apply many of the sug-
gestions of workers). Punishing or firing workers without a valid business reason
wastes resources that are critical for this learning process. See id. (asserting that Gen-
eral Motors finally realized that Japanese quality and price could not be obtained by
passing orders down the hierarchy, but stating that General Motors could duplicate
Japanese quality and price when managers fostered learning from worker suggestions).
208. See Richard H. Day, Adaptive Processes in Economic Theory, in ADAPTIVE
ECONOMIC MODELs 3-5 (Richard H. Day & Theodore Groves eds., 1975) (defining
adaptation as a reorganization of responses to competitive threats so that the enter-
prise survives). To survive in the environment of international competition, the
workplace must solve not only the accepted problems of routine production but also
the new threats from improved quality and efficiency of competing foreign
workplaces. See id. at 5 (proposing that when competition increases, successful enter-
prises must devote increased attention to discovering new ways of responding to new
challenges). If a workplace does not adapt to resolve competitive threats, the
workplace may bankrupt the firm. See id. at 10 (noting that bankruptcy results when
the firm does not respond adequately to competitive threats). During the bankruptcy
proceedings, the court often manages a proper reorganization so that the resulting firm
adapts more effectively to competitive threats. Id. In contrast, some enterprises adapt
or reorganize to meet competition without going through bankruptcy. See id. at 12
(recognizing that thoughtful managers can modify strategies and tactics before business
failure forces a change). When the courts allow the manager to fire the worker for
criticizing management decisions, the courts allow the manager to avoid facing the
elements of business reality that the worker presents. See id. at 3 (stating that the
firm's competitive environment consists of a threatening reality that the firm must
face and resolve in order to survive); id. at 15 (noting that a firm's failure to adapt
might derive either from wrongly analyzing the threat or from ineffective action to
the threat); Levin, supra note 11, at D-8 (implying that the Saturn automobile likely
would have less competitive success against the quality and price of foreign automo-
biles if managers could silence either the workers' analysis of workplace problems or
suggestions for solutions).
209. Harry Bernstein, Worker Participation Survives Early Woes, L.A. TiMS, Sept.
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controversy arises between manager and worker, two common tendencies
may interfere with learning: 1) managers may fire or punish the worker
for reasons unrelated to the job while attempting to avoid the discomfort
of the learning process,2t and 2) workers may acquiesce to even un-
reasonable commands unless the worker has reason to believe that the
initiative leading to a success will receive a credible reward.2 '
Therefore, permitting the manager to fire or punish the worker de-
stroys the learning process that may underlie a controversy between
worker and manager. Consequently, the court must consider the effects
of its action whether intervening or not intervening in an employment
termination. If the court intends to assist domestic producers in
achieving the level of learning that foreign producers accomplish on the
production line, then the court must select a remedy that encourages the
solution of the workplace problem that gave rise to the termination that
had no valid business reason. That is, the United States judicial process
must provide legal boundaries for containing workplace controversies
long enough for workers and managers to adapt to, rather than termi-
nate, the- learning process.
16, 1991, at D2. Workers are more involved with their jobs when their ideas compete
for making improvements in the workplace. See id. (observing that absenteeism drops
significantly when the workers participate in making the decisions). The job creates
more stress, however, when controversies between managers and workers are adminis-
tered to achieve learning. See id. (quoting the union president associated with a work-
er participation project). When workers assume responsibility for making improvements
in the workplace, they cannot blame somebody else but instead, must resolve any dif-
ficulties among themselves. ld.
210. See EDWARD R. SHAPIRO & A. WESLEY CARR, LOST IN FAMILIAR PLACES:
CREATNG NEW CONNECTIONS BETvEEN THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOcIETY 141 (1991)
(describing how the learning process in a law firm creates disorienting tensions).
When a new problem arises, managers and workers must accommodate the distracting
interpersonal confusion to assess the workplace issue. See id. at 136-41 (describing
the process of identifying the new workplace issue amid distracting interpersonal ten-
sions in a law firm).
211. See AGANBEGYAN, supra note 1, at 71 (stating the perestroika goal of in-
volving workers in making decisions which affect the workplace). Unless workers
share in making decisions, efficient decisions will not be made. Id. Furthermore, un-
less the workers have a protected right to share in the profitability resulting from in-
creases in efficiency, the workers will not put forth the effort required to improve
efficiency. Id.
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IV. DEVELOPING LAW TO COMPETE, NOT TO SUIT
IDEOLOGY
A. CHOOSING A PARADIGM 2 FOR COURT INTERVENTION
In an attempt to- avoid interference in the workplace, courts may
employ one of three strategies.2 '3 First, a court may recognize natural
business practices and pass judgment in conformity with observed
norms.2 14 Second, the court may simply defer to the manager's busi-
ness judgment regarding employment terminations."S Third, a court
may find that any new remedy for wrongful discharges would require
substantial investigation into broader social implications and thus, justify
shifting the burden to the legislature." 6
Though a court might attempt to avoid intervention by sustaining the
manager's decision to fire a worker, 7 this impulse ignores the history
and nature of the at-will doctrine.28 By creating the at-will doc-
212. See Laurence H. Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers
Can Learn from Modern Physics, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1, 23 (1989) (asserting that, if
the court believes it can administer justice without actively altering society, that belief
misleads the court so that the court does not notice the effects that court rulings
generate). The reactions of society do not permit the courts, or any other state
agency, to implement neutral rules for society. Id. at 25. Thus, when a state agency
implements a rule, the agency intervenes and turns the society to a new heading. Id.
at 10 and 10 n.40. Moreover, repeating a ruling induces new changes because the
society is not in the same situation that prevailed when the state agency previously
administered the rule. Id. at 20.
213. See Wysocki v. Norden Sys., Inc., No. CV90 03 15 43S, 1990 Conn. Super.
LEXIS 1369, at *6 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 12, 1990) (stating that the courts have a
"well established" rule to avoid interference in employment relations whenever the
employee does not have a contract specifying a term of employment).
214. See Bushko v. Miller Brewing Co., 396 N.W.2d 167, 171 (Wis. 1986) (giv-
ing direction to lower courts to screen discharge cases to protect the manager's cus-
tomary discretion in firing at-will employees).
215. See Darlington v. General Elec., 504 A.2d 306, 320 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984)
(declaring that "the employer should be master of his business").
216. See Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86, 89-90 (N.Y.
1983) (stating that the legislature should institute any limitations on the manager's
right to discharge because the legislature, and not the court, has resources to ascertain
and weigh the relevant interests within the community beyond the mere parties to the
suit).
217. See id. at 300 (arguing to retain the at-will termination rule because the court
feared the unknown effects from requiring managers to have a valid business reason
for firing workers).
218. See Tribe, supra note 212, at 25 (implying that sustaining the manager in a
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trine,219 the courts interfered with the business landscape," and inter-
fered with "the natural order of things,"'" as surely as they would by
protecting workers against management retaliation.' Thus, courts dis-
tort business practices even when enforcing the manager's right to
fire.' Denying a claim on the basis of employment-at-will maintains a
doctrine created by judicial fiat and perpetuates the original judicial
interventionm Consequently, the courts' choices are limited to options
that intervene, " either by: 1) endangering the status quo that courts
established with the at-will doctrine,' or 2) thwarting the processes by
controversy is as much an intervention as is protecting the worker against the
manager's adverse action). This intervention is inevitable because the court excludes
other possible outcomes that may be more efficient, more natural, or more equitable.
Id.
219. See, e.g., Martin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 42 N.E. 416 (1895) (creating
the employment-at-will doctrine for the State of New York).
220. See Beermann & Singer, supra note 41, at 986-87 (recalling that United
States courts, prior to creating the at-will presumption, had instituted a presumption
that employment was for a fixed term, usually a year).
221. See Tribe, supra note 212, at 20 (arguing that courts generally reshape rela-
tions in the society regardless of which side of a controversy prevails). Declaring for
either side in an employer-employee controversy modifies power relations compared
with the situation before the court made the decision. Id. at 24-25.
222. See Epstein, supra note 9, at 951-52 (stating that requiring managers to have
a valid business reason for firing a worker would distort the customary patterns of
doing business).
223. See Martin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 42 N.E. 416 (1895) (initiating in
New York the manager's right to fire the worker without having a valid reason);
Beermann & Singer, supra note 41, at 987 (stating that the courts created the em-
ployment-at-will presumption, so a court's claim of avoiding interference when up-
holding the rule is an illogical claim).
224. See Tribe, supra note 212, at 32 (arguing that stare decisis is a recognition
that the courts alter expectations in society by earlier decisions). An honoring of
precedent merely restates prior social choices by the courts. Id. at 25.
225. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down a state law
that interfered with the "right to contract"). The Court's choices were limited to either
interfering with the state legislative process or condoning the state's interference with
the contracting process. See id. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (faulting the majority
with preventing "the natural outcome of a dominant opinion"). Deciding with either
the majority or the dissenting position would entail intervening into an ongoing social
process. See Tribe, supra note 212, at 20, 24-25 (asserting that when the Court rec-
ognizes any particular view on property or contract rights the Court has intervened to
alter the status of society).
226. Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174, 179 (Pa. 1972). The ma-
jority rejected the plaintiff's request to overturn court precedent and intervene in em-
ployer decisions previously considered a matter of employer right. See id. (noting that
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which workers attempt to take responsibility for their workplaces.227
B. ESTABLISHING THE PRESUMPTIONS FOR EMPLOYMENT
WITHOUT A SPECIFIC CONTRACT
Because the court has no alternative but to intervene, either by perpet-
uating or by altering the court's own at-will intervention, it must identi-
fy and justify the proper basis for intervention.' Suggested rationales
for intervention include dominant practice, 9 controversy resolution,2"
and protection of equity." Dominant practice might refer to either the
domestic community 23 or the international community. 3
allowing such a cause of action would interfere with the employer's prerogative to
control the upper management in the firm).
227. See Geary, 319 A.2d at 184-85 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (contending that the
majority opinion disrupted the natural progression of cases protecting workers for acts
that responsibly protect the public from danger).
228. See Tribe, supra note 212, at 22-23 (asserting that an awareness of judicial
effects on the fabric of the society need not change the decisions rendered). Without
examining the courts' effects on the natural order of things, courts carelessly perpetu-
ate the view of those that the courts put in power. Id. at 38.
229. See Epstein, supra note 9, at 951-52 (maintaining that since most managers
in the United States consider their agreement with workers to be at-will, then the
court should presume an employment agreement is at-will, unless there is a specific
contract stating otherwise).
230. WEILER, supra note 2, at 96. The Montana Wrongful Discharge from Em-
ployment Act, MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-901 (1987) extinguishes the employer's right
to fire at-will, requires a valid business reason for firing, and encourages worker and
manager to settle. Id. at 96-97. The Montana Act serves to limit the employer's lia-
bility. Id. Another effort, the Model Uniform Employment Termination Act, provides
that either worker or manager can demand arbitration resolution of a termination dis-
pute. Model Uniform Employment Termination Act, supra note 25, § 5(a), (c). The
Model Act serves as a guideline for legislation requiring a manager to have a valid
business reason when firing a worker. Current Legal Remedies Are Inadequate for
Majority of Workers, Professor Says, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 132, at A-7 (July
10, 1991).
231. Epstein, supra note 9, at 974-76. A surplus value is created when the worker
becomes an expert in the workplace. Id. at 975. This surplus value represents the
benefit to the employer above the value of a replacement worker. Id. The surplus
value of an experienced worker forms the basis for a property interest. See Beermann
& Singer, supra note 41, at 952 (arguing that the court created real property interests,
such as adverse possession, to avoid inequities against productive pursuits, and hence,
the court should also create a property interest to protect the investment of the long-
term employee in the workplace).
232. See Epstein, supra note 9, at 951-52 (arguing that, in the United States, the
presumption of the at-will contract exists to simplify employer-employee relations).
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By asserting that managers must retain the power to fire workers at-
will,. ' the courts promote a traditional American idea that management
by hierarchy makes good business. This assumption may or may not
accord with reality, especially given the new competition from
abroad.' For example, the success of the General Motors Saturn pro-
ject depended on giving workers rights against hierarchical managers,
thus illustrating the elemental weakness of the assumptions underlying
the at-will doctrine.' Before the Saturn project, General Motors unsuc-
cessfuly had attempted to make domestic production lines more compet-
itive by applying traditional hierarchical management methods, demon-
strating the assumption that the at-will doctrine reflects: the success of
the enterprise depends upon management control over workers.' When
Because the at-will contract is the dominant practice in the employment context, a
presumption requiring a valid business reason for termination would require managers
and workers to expend extra energy drafting at-will contracts. Id.
233. See Lane Kirkland, Don't Undercut Workers, USA TODAY. Apr. 10. 1992, at
10A (noting that German and Japanese companies have built a superior competitive
position without resorting to such tactics as "permanent replacements" for strikers).
Germany and Japan build long-term relationships with workers in return for higher
productivity. l American corporations, on the other hand, are permitted by law to
replace workers to lower costs. Id. Though these managers believe they are improving
the corporate position, they are destroying the workplace experience that is essential
for America in meeting the competition from Germany and Japan. See id. (stating that
America can recover a competitive position in international markets only if managers
provide experienced workers with a real voice in managing the workplace).
234. See Merrill v. Crothall-American, Inc., 606 A.2d 96, 101-03 (Del. 1992)
(asserting that absent bad faith, a manager may terminate an employee without regard
to the employee's perception of the job's duration).
235. See id (theorizing that the legal tension in a controversy between manager
and worker consists of the manager's need to act in self-interest versus the society's
requirement that the manager not overreach in bargaining with the worker). A more
realistic approach may entail determining whether manager or worker has the more
accurate perception of the workplace. See Beermann & Singer, supra note 41, at 918
(summarizing insights that international competition may require providing a more
secure environment for the worker); Space Shuttle Accident Hearings, supra note 7, at
72-73, 78-79 (statement of Hon. William P. Rogers, Chairman, Presidential Commis-
sion on the Space Shuttle "Challenger" Accident) (recommending a deliberative pro-
cess to improve communication between management and other personnel to eliminate
flawed decision making).
236. See Levin, supra note 11, 'at D-8 (describing the General Motors learning
process in attempting to duplicate the quality and cost performance of Japanese pro-
duction lines).
237. See Levin, supra note 11, at D-8 (describing the traditional hierarchical prac-
tice of assuming that, in a controversy between manager and worker, the manager
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domestic manufacturing dominated domestic markets, hierarchical man-
agement methods indeed may have facilitated production by helping to
restrain worker objections, with minimal impact on American competi-
tiveness. Given more intense international competition in domestic mar-
kets, however, hierarchical management methods fail because they are
less efficient than management methods practiced abroad. u8
Thus, the courts' justification for perpetuating the at-will doctrine,
given prevailing business conditions, seems as provincial 9 as the
mindset of the Brezhnev theoreticians in the former Soviet Union. These
theoreticians paralleled the tendency of current American courts by re-
fusing to examine assumptions in light of the management presumptions
that consistently have given foreign competitors the advantage in inter-
national markets.Y American courts have failed to reassess their role
in preserving an obsolete presumption and, therefore, can be unwitting
accomplices in retarding American competitiveness."u
should prevail). Ford Motor Company and General Motors improved their competitive
position in international markets by abandoning the presumption that the manager had
the right answer. Id.
238. Levin, supra note 11, at D-8.
239. See Tribe, supra note 212, at 24-25 (asserting that every court judges from
the point of view of a value-imposing paradigm which inevitably modifies the soci-
ety). A court's effect on society is not the result of the court's intention or action
alone, but rather the reaction of the society to what the court does. Id. at 21-22. A
reasonable court, then, must consider the changes it makes whether the court assesses
its role as passive or aggressive. Id. at 22-23.
240. See AGANBEGYAN, supra note 1, at 149-50 (describing the pre-1985 Soviet
institutions that repeatedly rejected proven management methods that had improved
quality and price in foreign production facilities). Reformers had developed the
perestroika proposals for decentralizing decision making and limiting manager preroga-
tives over workers before Gorbachev came to power in 1985. See id. at 150 (repeat-
ing Gorbachev's statement that activists had developed the perestroika ideas before he
came to power).
241. See Epstein, supra note 9, at 951 (suggesting that if the courts makes the
wrong presumption, the courts bias business to inefficient operations, by encouraging a
theoretically waivable requirement to become conclusive in fact). Theoretically, the at-
will presumption is waivable, but has, through court intervention, become conclusive
in fact. See Minda & Raab, supra note 71, at 1183-84 (illustrating the persistence of
the at-will presumption even in the face of legislative resistance).
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V. RECOMMENDED COMMON LAW AND STATUTORY
PROTECTION FOR WORKERS ATTEMPTING TO
IMPROVE THE WORKPLACE
A. ALTERNATIVES FOR PROPERTY PROTECTION OF WORKER
RESOURCEFULNESS
Nevertheless, the principles of United States property law afford a
policy basis for court protection of the worker's investment in the
workplace at least when the society needs that investment. 2 In partic-
ular, the laws of adverse possession, "- mortgage equity,'" and long-
term tenant rights2 suggest that society may benefit from protecting
critical worker skills as against the rights of managers. Moreover, the
traditional view of private ownership as a means of promoting produc-
tivity' suggests that the worker's interest should merit court protection
when the worker's skills represent necessary elements in international
competition.
In summary, the principles of property law can provide a legal frame-
work for recognizing the worker's property interest in workplace-specific
skills"47 while responding to three fundamental policy concerns. First, a
242. Beermann & Singer, supra note 41, at 952.
243. Beermann & Singer, supra note 41, at 950-51. Depriving the worker of a
property right in personal effort would amount to discouraging productive labor. See
id. (arguing that taking land away from the adverse possessor who put personal effort
into making the land productive would harm society by discouraging the productive
use of abandoned land).
244. Beernann & Singer, supra note 41, at 949-950. Denying the worker of a
property interest would amount to allowing control of the entire bundle of property
rights by someone not deserving. See id. (maintaining that restricting the lenders
property right to only the unpaid amount of the loan permits the unhindered access of
a homeowner while protecting the lender's value).
245. Beermann & Singer, supra note 41, at 951. Granting the worker a property
right in personal effort would improve proper care of vital resources that concern the
society as a whole. See id (contending that transfer of title to long-term lessees while
compensating the legal owner for value encourages homeowners to become self-suffi-
cient).
246. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 30 (3d ed. 1986)
(stating that any resource of importance to the society will be more productive if the
court recognizes a private property interest in it). Valuable resources which are not
assigned to an owner will be vulnerable to uneconomical use. See id. at 30-31 (argu-
ing that a pasture not assigned to an owner is vulnerable to overgrazing because no
one has sufficient incentive to control misuse).
247. See ROBERT B. REICH, THE ,VORK OF NATIONS: PREPARING OURSELVES FOR
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worker's skills in promoting creative solutions should merit the court's
protection because these skills constitute a primary United States
strength in global markets.2' Second, though generally courts have hin-
dered rather than assisted the development of decentralized decision
making in American workplaces, that hindrance derived from considering
the worker's civic worth, not from weighing the importance of the
worker's skills.u9 Third, protecting the worker's skills need not involve
new legal principles, for, as shown in the following section, the com-
mon law doctrine of emblements' not only demonstrates the legal na-
21sT-CENTURY CAPrrALIsM 208, 219-21 (stating that America's strength in interna-
tional markets is providing technical and managerial talents for solving new problems).
Making a production facility competitive in modem international markets requires that
workers become responsible for solving new problems as they arise. A. H. Raskin,
The Role of and Challenges Facing Unions in the 1940's and the 1980's - A Com-
parison, 52 FORDHAM L. REv. 1071, 1080 (1984). Survival of key American indus-
tries may depend on encouraging American workers to enhance workplace-specific
skills. Id. at 1078.
248. See REICH, supra note 245, at 196 (noting that the basis for competitive
success in international markets has changed in the last twenty years). The economic
health of the United States no longer depends on the success of United States corpo-
rations. See id. at 209 and 209 n.1 (noting that, when higher productivity derives
from moving manufacturing capital to lower-cost labor markets, corporations are
forced by international competition to migrate routine production facilities and jobs).
Rather, in the modem era, United States economic health depends on the value that
United States workers produce for the global economy. See id. at 208-09 (noting that
while the wages are declining for workers performing routine production, the wage
rates are rising for those who make headway on the tough problems such as produc-
ing higher quality at lower cost). Accordingly, encouraging the quality of work force
that will be competititive in international markets requires training and sustaining
workers who have the ability and resolve to challenge manager decisions that appear
faulty. See id. at 231 (asserting that the quality of worker that can provide competi-
tive value in international markets is not one who solves the problem given, but
rather one who looks for short-cuts within the worker's overall comprehension of the
workplace task). By fostering an attitude among workers to think for themselves and
coordinate with others, the United States would enhance a natural economic strength
and market advantage. See id. at 234-35 (noting that the worker who can make the
United States competitive in international markets requires an appropriate environment
that allows and promotes creativity).
249. See supra notes 234-46 and accompanying text (describing American court
hindrances to applying worker resourcefulness in making American manufacturing
competitive *in international markets).
250. See Moy v. Silveira, 7 Cal. Rptr. 251, 253 (Cal. Ct. App. 1960) '(holding
that though a lease of uncertain tenure might terminate, the property interest in a
crop of tomatoes remains with the farmer that planted, and that the farmer, under
law, has access to the land as necessary for harvesting the crop). If a farmer leases
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ture of the skills meriting protection, but also illustrates the extent of
protection that would suffice to promote the competitiveness of United
States workplaces.
B. WORKPLACE-SPECIFIC SKILLS: RESOURCES ATTACHED TO AN
UNDERLYING PROPERTY RIGHT OF INDEFINITE TERM
If a worker has an at-will contract with a manager, the contract ex-
pires when either the worker or the manager says that the contract is
terminated.l t Hence, the contract of employment is of uncertain
term.' A manager's termination of an at-will contract extinguishes'
any remaining contract interest the discharged worker might have in the
workplace.'
Nonetheless, a worker under a contract of uncertain term may elect to
land from someone who has only a life estate, the farmer's lease terminates when the
lessor dies. Jones v. Scott, 31 So.2d 361, 363 (Ala. 1947). Hence, such a fanner has
a lease of uncertain tenure. Dupree v. Worthen Bank & Trust Co., 543 S.W.2d 465.
467 (Ark. 1976). That farmer may still elect to plant and cultivate with the hope of
harvest. Id. If the fanner's life-tenant lessor dies while the crop is still growing, and
yet unripe, the farmer is in jeopardy of losing the fruits of toil. Id. After the life-
tenant lessor dies, ownership of the land passes to the remainderman. Id.
The crops, however, do not pass in ownership to the remainderman. OHIo REV.
CODE ANN. § 2115.10 (Baldwin 1991). Under the law of emblements, the crops, if
planted before the life-tenant lessor died, will belong to the lessee of the life-tenant.
Moy v. Silveira, 7 Cal. Rptr. 251, 253 (Cal. Ct. App. 1960). Though the lease be
terminated and though any subsequent, implied tenancy at-will be also terminated, the
farmer is granted protection for the crops and is granted lawful access onto the land
for purposes of cultivating and harvesting those crops. ld. After the crops have been
harvested, the lessee of the life-tenant then becomes a stranger to the land and can
no longer enter the land without trespassing, unless the lessee of the life-tenant has
permission to enter from the remainderman-owner. See id (granting time of access
only through the time necessary to harvest the crop).
The policy purpose for the law of emblements is to encourage the growth of
crops since crops are important to the society. Noble v. Tyler, 56 N.E. 191, 193
(Ohio 1900). Relatively, the growth of crops is more important than the harm to the
remainderman-owner in losing the enjoyment of the land for the reasonable time
required for the lessee to cultivate and harvest the crops. Id Because crops are im-
portant to the society, the farmer's property interest in the crops is protected even if
the farmer's lease of uncertain term terminates, by no fault of the farmer. Id. If the
farmer bears the peril of reaping, sowing would be discouraged. d
251. See Epstein, supra note 9, at 954 (defining employment-at-will).
252. See Epstein, supra note 9, at 954 (defining employment-at-will).
253. See Epstein, supra note 9, at 954 (defining employment-at-will).
254. See Epstein, supra note 9, at 954 (defining employment-at-will).
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develop certain skills and resourcefulness that are not transferrable to
another workplace.'5 Should the manager terminate an at-will worker
who has developed such skills, then the worker likely will lose the fruits
of toil that those skills represent.' Moreover, the loss of workplace-
specific skills harms society as well as the worker, because such skills
are a means of adding value to output.' 7
Consequently, courts should not encourage the waste of workplace-
specific skills and resourcefulness through strict application of the at-will
doctrine. Just as the law of emblements grants the planter certain prop-
erty interests in crops after the termination of an agricultural lease,
courts should recognize the worker's property interest in workplace-
specific skills by granting the worker an exemption from the at-will
doctrine." 8 Under this framework, workplace-specific skills, if devel-
oped before termination, "9 would comprise a property interest belong-
ing to the worker.' Courts should protect the worker's property inter-
est in workplace-specific skills by granting the worker access to the
workplace for the time those skills represent a national resource. 6' Af-
ter the skills no longer represent a national resource, then the worker no
longer has a right of access to the workplace."2
The policy purpose in protecting the worker's property interest against
the employer's right to fire at-will is to encourage workers to develop
255. See Epstein, supra note 9, at 973 (recognizing workplace-specific skills).
256. See Epstein, supra note 9, at 973 (recognizing that termination destroys
workplace-specific skills).
257. See REICH, supra note 245, at 196 (asserting that recovery of the American
economy will depend on the value that American labor adds to the global economy);
Epstein, supra note 9, at 973 (recognizing that termination destroys workplace-specific
skills).
258. See Moy v. Silveira, 7 Cal. Rptr. 251, 253 (Cal. Ct. App. 1960) (asserting
that crops grown on a property right of uncertain term do not pass to the owner, but
remain property of the person who can best advance the valuable resource to a mar-
ketable state).
259. See Dupree v. Worthen Bank & Trust Co., 543 S.W.2d 465, 467 (Ark. 1976)
(noting that the planter is not protected unless the planting was begun before the
termination of the tenancy).
260. Beermann & Singer, supra note 41, at 951 (arguing that the American work-
er would have a greater incentive to increase efficiency if the worker had a protected
property right in the workplace).
261. See id. (holding that access to the land is granted to the planter so that the
crops can be harvested by the one who will best protect society's interest in crops).
262. See id. (holding that the planter's right of access to the land terminates after
the planter has harvested the crop and that the planter then becomes stranger to the
land unless granted permission to pass by the remainderman).
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workplace-specific skills and resourcefulness that promote American
competitiveness in global markets.' These interests outweigh the inter-
ests involved in management's right to terminate workers at will.' Re-
quiring a just cause for firing is a reasonable restraint on managers and
owners of the workplace given the social and economic value of
workplace-specific skills.' Thus, courts should protect the worker's
property interest in workplace-specific skills even if, through no fault of
the worker, the at-will employment contract expires. Without this
protection, the worker bears the peril of termination and lacks the incen-
tive to develop critical workplace-specific skills.' T
CONCLUSION
Before 1980, domestic production in both the Soviet Union' and
the United States' dominated the respective domestic markets. Be-
cause of this domination, both nations could formulate industrial and
labor policy without much fear of diminution of domestic market
share.' Since 1980, however, intense foreign competition has forced
open domestic markets in both nations, causing domestic manufacturing
to struggle for survivalY'
In an effort to regain competitiveness, both America and the republics
of the former Soviet Union must restructure their economiesm The
263. See Noble v. Tyler, 56 N.E. 191, 193 (Ohio 1900) (holding, in an age when
agriculture was crucial to national development, that recognizing the planter's rights to
the crops cultivated by the planter was necessary to protect society's dependence on
properly harvested crops).
264. See id. (holding that the owner's loss of control over the property was less
important than encouraging the cultivation of resources vital to the national economy).
265. See i (balancing the harm to the owner compared with the harm to the
society from reduced cultivation of resources important to the national economy).
266. See id (conditioning the planter's right to the crops on the planter not being
cause of the termination).
267. See id. (explaining that the court recognized the planter's right to the crops
in order to maintain an incentive for the development of resources important to the
society).
268. AGANBEGYAN, supra note 1, at 173. The Ministry of Foreign Trade con-
trolled foreign imports to Soviet markets. Il
269. See WEu.ER, supra note 2, at 132 (describing foreign penetration of the rela-
tively insulated United States automobile market during the 1980's).
270. REICH, supra note 245, at 72-73. Various protectionist mechanisms allowed
American corporations and labor to bargain with domestic partners by local customs
without having to consider international advances and trends. Id.
271. REICH, supra note 247, at 76-77.
272. See REICH, supra note 247, at 219-221 (recommending that American busi-
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United States can learn from the Soviet experience with perestroika
because the attitude toward labor in the United States resembles that in
the former Soviet Union: the manager commands, and the worker
obeys. 73 Specifically, three lessons from the Soviet experience with
perestroika should guide American policy with respect to recovering a
reasonable domestic market share.
First, democracy is not merely a political means of restricting govern-
ment."4 Democracy can be a potent economic strategy for competing
in international markets.' 5 Theoretically, high quality at low cost might
arise from many different combinations of management and labor poli-
cy. 76 The most feasible basis, however, appears to be the German and
Japanese rule that perestroika emulated: make the workers responsible
for the decisions of the enterprise.'m
Second, democratizing the workplace to promote efficiency will not
succeed if it is merely a prerogative of management." 8 Workers must
have a meaningful voice in the decision making process." 9 That is, the
workers must have sufficient power so that those who have good ideas
for improving the workplace have a reasonable chance to implement
ness restructure to capitalize on the American strengths in management and technology
in an effort to re-establish American profitability); Uchitelle, supra note 95 (stating
that a Russian automobile manufacturer redesigned the production facilities specifically
to produce vehicles for export).
273. WEILER, supra note 2, at 196-97; IOFFE & MAGGS, supra note 98, at 3.
274. See supra note 168 (suggesting that democracy in the workplace might serve
merely material ends by increasing efficiency and quality of work).
275. See supra note 4 (outlining Gorbachev's view that workplaces competitive in
international markets must necessarily provide certain degrees of democratic protections
for worker initiatives and resourcefulness).
276. See Levin, supra note 11, at D-8 (comparing Japanese and American theories
on achieving high quality at low cost).
277. See Levin, supra note 11, at D-8 (indicating the non-competitiveness of meth-
ods other than making the workers responsible for quality and efficiency).
278. AGANBEGYAN, supra note 1, at 167. Mere liberalizing consists of managers
granting privileges that can be taken away. [d. If the worker's bargaining power is
based on the manager's authority, then the worker has no influence when progress re-
quires learning on the part of the manager. See Kirkland, supra note 233 (stating that
manager-sponsored work councils or union functions do not provide a voice for the
worker when hard bargaining is necessary).
279. See WEILER, 'supra note 2, at 291 (arguing that American success in inter-
national markets requires providing workers with influence over workplace decisions);
Tchetvernina, supra note 2, at 213-14 (maintaining that, if the worker has a guaran-
teed property interest in the workplace, then the worker has incentives as well as the
means to increase the productivity of the workplace).
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them. ' Furthermore, the worker should be guaranteed some return on
improvements that result from the worker's investment of skills and
resourcefulness. This guarantee would provide the worker with an
incentive to initiate and promote innovative ideas." Additionally, when
the worker legitimately objects to management decisions that harm or
hinder improvements in the workplace, the worker must have protection
against manager retaliation.'
Third, just as courts protect crops on land held by a lease of uncer-
tain tenure, they should protect the worker's property interest in
workplace-specific skills' that might outlast the term of employ-
ment.' Under the at-will doctrine, the manager may terminate the em-
ployment contract regardless of the loss to the worker and to society. In
.the context of intense international competition, however, workplace-
specific skills represent a national resource that should have the protec-
tion of law.'
Effective protection of workplace-specific skills will require: 1) imple-
menting a process for workers to influence management decisions; ' 2)
280. See WElLEP, supra note 2, at 285 (suggesting that workers should be given
influence over such decisions as wages, benefits, hiring, firing, training, discipline,
promotion, and grievances).
281. See Saturn Pact Is Amended, N.Y. TitMs, Nov. 15, 1991, at D4 (reporting
that attainment of training, quality, and production goals will determine 20% of the
worker's pay in 1995 at the Spring Hill, Tennessee, Saturn plant).
282. Levin, supra note 11. At a typical Japanese automobile plant over half of the
worker suggestions are implemented resulting in worker recognition, prizes, and mone-
tary awards. Id.
283. Bordell v. General Elec. Co., 564 N.Y.S.2d 802, 805 (App. Div. 1990)
(granting a cause of action where a health professional was fired for reporting un-
healthful radiation levels).
284. See AGANBEGYAN, supra note 1, at 80-81 (describing the workplace im-
provements possible when the worker feels like a master).
285. See Strand v. Boll, 183 N.W. 284 (S.D. 1921) (granting the lessee of a life
tenant possession of the land against the remainderman, for purposes of harvesting
crops, where the lessee had planted before the death of the life tenant). The court
awarded the temporary possession as a matter of public policy to encourage the plant-
ing and cultivation of'crops even in times of uncertain tenure. Id.
286. See supra notes 247-48 (arguing that workplace-specific skills represent re-
sources that government policy should promote rather than hinder).
287. WEILER, supra note 2; at 284-88 and 288 n.73. Germany establishes a work
council concept which provides each workplace with a procedure for workers to par-
ticipate in the decisions affecting the workplace. ld. Japan organizes workplace com-
mittees that provide workers with an opportunity to influence manager decisions.
GOULD, supra note 197, at 95.
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altering the laws governing the manager-worker relationship to reduce
rigid distinctions;2" and 3) providing an adequately strong remedy of
reinstatement to curtail retaliation when workers attempt to improve the
workplace.'
288. GOuLD, supra note 197, at 95-97. The United States tradition is characterized
by an adversarial relation between manager and worker. Id. at 94. The distinction be-
tween manager and worker is established as a matter of law in the National Labor
Relations Act. 29 U.S.C. § 152(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1970). Workplace commit-
tees may qualify as labor organizations. 29 U.S.C. § 152(5). See NLRB v. Cabot
Carbon, 360 U.S. 203, 205 (1959) (interpreting 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) as including
groups that process employee complaints). Employers are prohibited from organizing
or subsidizing a labor union. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2).
289. Statements Adopted, supra note 25. Where the reinstated worker has union
support, the occurrence of manager retaliation for the reinstatement is low. Id. On the
other hand, without union support, many reinstated workers do not actually return to
the job, or they leave within one year. Id.
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